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323 
Article 
Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers 
Lawrence A. Cunningham† 
Corporate and securities law scholars increasingly investi-
gate the role of rewards to promote desired behavior.1 Scholars 
have contributed considerable analysis to the utility of positive 
incentives for corporate whistleblowers;2 a growing body of lit-
erature addresses paying rewards to effective capital market 
gatekeepers, with attention given to outside directors3 and law-
yers.4 Previous literature on gatekeepers concentrated on de-
signing a liability system to achieve optimal deterrence while 
 
 † Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Thanks 
to John Coffee, Melvin Eisenberg, Claire Hill, Alan Palmiter, and other partic-
ipants in Columbia University Law School’s conference, “Gatekeepers Today: 
The Professions After the Reforms” (Sept. 29, 2006), where I presented an ear-
ly version of this Article, and to Assaf Hamdani. Copyright © 2007 by Law-
rence A. Cunningham.  
 1. Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Cor-
porations, 62 BUS. LAW. 161, 171–73, 189–91 (2006) (offering “honest corpora-
tions” exemptions from certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 2. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”: Post-Enron Regulatory 
Initiatives, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 318–22 (2004); Richard E. Moberly, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 
2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1133–38; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protec-
tion: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities 
Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 111–14 (2007).  
 3. See Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Direc-
tors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1691–93, 1703–07 (2007) (proposing a hypotheti-
cal reverse negligence regime in which directors can sue to recover rewards 
following a triggering event, such as misreporting, by proving that they were 
nonnegligent in performing their duties or otherwise exceeded designated 
standards, and also suggesting two more modest alternatives that reward di-
rectors who resign in certain circumstances and authorize board “leadership 
awards” to pay bonuses to outside directors for taking designated actions). 
 4. See David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal for 
Granting Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1837–38, 1840 (2004) (offering transactional immunity to 
securities lawyers who first report violations of law to authorities). 
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relying largely on gatekeeper reputation as a self-enforcement 
device.5 This Article reviews the previous literature, noting in-
herent limitations of reputation and liability threats, including 
how the latter discourage gatekeepers from performing desira-
ble services such as fraud detection. This Article then begins to 
explore how a rewards program might be designed to overcome 
some of those limitations and improve gatekeeper effectiveness. 
The expanding interest in positive incentives for capital 
market gatekeepers dovetails with a broader and older trend in 
the regulation literature. This trend reflects a philosophical 
shift away from traditional deterrence-oriented strategies to-
ward more cooperative and rewards-oriented systems to pro-
mote compliance.6 This approach joins market and regulatory 
accountability mechanisms that are described using terms such 
as cooperative compliance, interactive compliance, responsive 
regulation, collaborative governance, and cooperative imple-
mentation.7 Empirical psychological evidence suggesting that 
positive incentives may be more likely to promote desired be-
havior than negative threats is an important inspiration for 
this shift.8 
This Article considers the context of financial reporting in 
connection with securities transactions. Complex forces of so-
cial norms and legal culture shape the character of financial 
reports. Forces operate at both the enterprise level and among 
 
 5. The seminal contributions to the theory of capital market gatekeeping 
are Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Le-
gal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Lia-
bility] and Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers]. The ensuing discussion notes additional contributions to this li-
terature. 
 6. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3–7 (1992). 
 7. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Ne-
gotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487–91 (2003) (discussing both the 
rise of “negotiated governance” models and the limitations of such models). See 
generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (introducing 
a framework for analyzing regulatory programs); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. 
MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE (1988) (proposing “interac-
tive compliance” as a process through which business and government might 
work toward a more beneficial and more cooperative relationship). 
 8. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6, at 49 (“As opposed to the 
maximal-operant principle, a great deal of empirical evidence supports a mi-
nimal-sufficiency principle: the less salient and powerful the control technique 
used to secure compliance, the more likely that internalization will result.”). 
See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (creating a 
framework for analyzing which factors maximize compliance with the law). 
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third parties that enterprises enlist to assist in preparing dis-
closure, such as accountants and lawyers. While law can influ-
ence financial reporting quality through negative threats or 
positive incentives, lawyers and legal scholars focus nearly en-
tirely on negative threats, designing liability regimes to induce 
fair reporting.9 Laws impose duties on enterprises, individuals, 
outside accounting and law firms, and their individual profes-
sional employees.10 The liability risks backing these regimes 
can be criminal or civil and include money damages, prison 
terms, fines, license revocations, and the like.11 Layers of liabil-
ity analysis result.  
Yet law never supplies positive inducements (even lighter 
sanctions for conscientious enterprises or gatekeepers are 
weaker sticks, not carrots). True, traditional analysis also em-
phasizes reputation, but mainly because gatekeepers put it at 
risk when attesting to the veracity of an enterprise’s assertions, 
meaning this operates more as a stick than as a carrot. One 
consequence of the existing regime’s emphasis on liability 
threats is the generation of impressive professional resistance 
to undertaking a variety of potentially useful functions. For ex-
ample, the auditing profession has long resisted any undertak-
ing to detect for fraud in financial audits and the legal profes-
sion has long resisted any undertaking to conduct due diligence 
exercises in preparing public offerings of securities. 
The prevailing regime’s overwhelming emphasis on sticks 
offers limited assurance of success. That system failed during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Yet reforms concentrate on re-
configuring the type and combination of sticks in use. For ex-
ample, many emphasize the reduced threat of auditor liability 
during that period and respond by prescribing enhanced penal-
ties.12 Others point to factors that reduce auditor investment in 
 
 9. See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 897–98. 
 10. See Bucy, supra note 2, at 279–92 (discussing duties imposed upon 
lawyers and corporate officials to deter financial fraud). 
 11. See id. (discussing criminal sanctions for certain offenses related to 
financial fraud). 
 12. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 152–56 (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS]; 
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1350 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Shareholder Value]; William 
W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 
470 (2003) [hereinafter Bratton, Auditor Independence]; John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 
1403, 1409–10 (2002). 
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reputation, such as industry concentration,13 differences be-
tween partner incentives and firm-level incentives,14 and the 
proliferation of nonaudit services.15  
Law’s preoccupation with liability design is understanda-
ble since lawyers have a comparative advantage in liability de-
sign. Designing reward systems may seem beyond law’s scope 
or lawyers’ competence. A lawyer might expect that if rewards 
programs are productive, then market participants would de-
sign and implement them. While this seems correct, two quali-
fications are relevant. First, nonmarket impediments can fru-
strate the implementation of good ideas. For example, 
gatekeepers fear that demonstrating the capability to perform a 
task will expose them to liability. Second, contemporary finan-
cial reporting occurs in a complex setting that combines free 
market innovation with considerable regulatory limitations. 
The combination may prevent otherwise appealing contractual 
innovations from gaining traction. If so, lawyers—and legal 
scholars—may have the capacity to spark ideas that markets 
can test and implement. It is in that spirit that this Article in-
troduces the possibility of going beyond liability to designing 
rewards for effective gatekeepers. 
Part I reviews the theory of capital market gatekeeping. It 
presents the conceptual underpinnings of the model and how a 
combination of reputation and liability risks sustains it. Part II 
analyzes recent experience that shows limitations on the theory 
in practice, including limitations that continue despite various 
reforms. From this fairly extensive review offered to provide 
context, a rewards program emerges as a way to meet some of 
 
 13. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-03-864, PUB-
LIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETI-
TION 16, 20–22 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf; 
Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish for: How Accountants and Con-
gress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 787–
88 (2004); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 775, 786 (2006); see also infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate 
Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 407–08 (2004) [hereinafter 
Macey, Efficient Capital Markets]; Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Obser-
vations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the 
Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2003); Richard W. Painter, 
Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 397, 412 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional 
Firms After Enron, 29 J. CORP. L. 427, 447 (2004); see also infra notes 104–09 
and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 1350; Prentice, 
supra note 13, at 786–87; see also infra notes 111–21 and accompanying text. 
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these limitations. The analysis in each of these Parts highlights 
how the prevailing approach has the perverse effect of discou-
raging gatekeepers from performing vital functions.  
Part III explores ways to design positive incentives to pro-
mote effective capital market gatekeeping. It draws on the in-
tuition behind the evidence suggesting that positive incentives 
can be more effective than negative threats in promoting de-
sired behavior. Positive incentives can induce gatekeepers to 
perform vital functions that the current regime discourages 
them from performing. While this Article cannot provide all the 
details of a comprehensive incentive program applicable for all 
gatekeepers in all circumstances, it contributes a general 
framework, model, and illustrations to the emerging literature 
taking the rewards approach. 
I.  THEORY   
This Part reviews the well-known theory of capital market 
gatekeeping. Part I.A summarizes the standard model, distin-
guishing gatekeepers from whistleblowers and from various 
hybrid roles that professionals can assume. Part I.B focuses on 
the conditions necessary for effective gatekeeping (reputation 
and liability risk). Part I.C discusses costs of the standard 
model. The review invites inquiry into how adding explicit posi-
tive incentives can promote more effective gatekeeping. 
A. CONCEPTIONS 
Several varieties of third-party assistance in accessing cap-
ital markets exist. The following considers the attributes and 
distinctions among those usually described as “gatekeepers” 
and “whistleblowers” and then considers some that embody 
attributes of each (called hybrids below). 
1. Gatekeepers 
Gatekeepers work with an enterprise to correct misreport-
ing before it occurs.16 They do so by threatening to withhold 
support necessary to complete a report or consummate a trans-
action.17 Gatekeepers can deny access to capital mar- 
 
 16. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A De-
mand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (“A well-functioning 
gatekeeper regime is an elegant enforcement strategy. Wrongdoing is pre-
vented, rather than punished after the fact, without the substantial adminis-
trative costs of a formal enforcement proceeding.”).  
 17. Id. 
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kets.18 Thus gatekeepers are “intermediaries who provide veri-
fication and certification services to investors” by pledging their 
professional reputations19—and, by withholding such support, 
block admission through the gate.20 
Law’s gatekeeper approach always imposes a monitoring 
duty but not necessarily a reporting duty: eventual discovery 
exposes the gatekeeper to liability for the primary violation, not 
merely a remedy for nonreporting. Even so, the gatekeeper ap-
proach is intended to give professionals regulatory incentives to 
prevent misreporting.21 Most gatekeepers are paid for their 
services by the enterprises that retain them; all bear stated du-
ties whose breach exposes them to legal liability. 
Gatekeepers include auditors and attorneys, who work di-
rectly with and essentially inside the enterprise. Auditors at-
test to financial statement assertions under duties established 
by statute and articulated in professional codes of perfor-
mance.22 Lawyers advise on transaction design and disclosure. 
 
 18. See Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary 
Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1246–47 
(2000). 
 19. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Eco-
nomic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 279–80 (2004). 
 20. This reconciles what otherwise appears to be two distinct definitional 
conceptions of gatekeepers that appear in the literature. See Erik F. Gerding, 
The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regula-
tion, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 426 n.219 (2006) (identifying two strands of defini-
tion as those who (1) certify as reputational intermediaries or (2) restrict 
access and endorse those admitted with their reputation for discretion); Peter 
B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 740–42 (2004) (noting conflation of the 
reputational intermediary and the professional capable of disrupting entry 
and exploring the distinction). 
 21. See Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2169, 2227, 2245 (2004). 
 22. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000 & 
Supp. IV 2006) (delineating audit requirements for detecting illegal acts); Re-
vision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirement’s, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-7919, 73 SEC Docket 2591 (Nov. 21 2001) (delineating reg-
ulations stating independence requirements); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99 (Am. 
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002) (delineating professional standards 
as to consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit, later adopted by 
the Public Company Accounting Operating Board (PCAOB)); CODIFICATION OF 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards 
No. 95 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2001) (setting forth a profes-
sional statement of generally accepted auditing standards, later adopted by 
the PCAOB); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, 
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 54 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accoun-
tants 1988) (setting forth professional standards stating such requirements, 
later adopted by the PCAOB). As for standards originally established by the 
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Lawyers often determine whether senior executives can sign 
disclosure documents and also provide written legal opinions or 
memoranda concerning the legality of transactions and their 
compliance with law. Duties of both auditors and lawyers arise 
initially from contract but include a regulatory overlay of pro-
fessional standards. 
Gatekeepers also include other transaction participants, 
such as investment banks and sometimes rating agencies, plus 
professionals working apart from transactions or outside the 
enterprise, such as securities analysts, and possibly stock ex-
changes and mutual funds.23 Unlike auditors and lawyers, 
these gatekeepers do not typically act under any legal duty or 
vouch for statements that the enterprise makes about itself. In-
stead they provide their own statements, such as a securities 
rating or a buy-sell recommendation. 
Professionals within this broad conception of gatekeepers 
thus differ significantly.24 Roles vary with product or service 
type and the information the gatekeepers’ buyers and users re-
ceive. Also varying are what professionals attest to or certify, 
such as fairness of financial statement assertions, legality of a 
securities issuance, and quality of a debt instrument.25 
Accordingly, all other public policy aspects of their respec-
tive performance vary, including requirements, expectations, 
capacities, incentives and appropriate legal liability for fail-
ure.26 Indeed, auditors and attorneys reside at opposite ends of 
a gatekeeping spectrum: both put reputations and liability on 
the line but lawyers take leading roles in deal design and dis-
closure preparation. On the other hand, auditors take back-up 
roles in reviewing and testing disclosure.27 Despite these differ-
 
AICPA adopted by the PCOAB, see Order Regarding Section 103(a)(3)(B) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47,745, 
80 SEC Docket 181 (Apr. 25, 2003) (endorsing PCAOB adoption as interim 
standards of those previously adopted by the AICPA). 
 23. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial 
Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 
417–18 n.6 (2004). 
 24. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge 
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 306–07, 346–64 (2004) 
(stating that “all gatekeepers are not alike,” and developing proposals with en-
tirely different content for auditors and for securities lawyers). 
 25. See Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., 
FIN. & COM. L. 119, 124–34 (2006) (distinguishing between independent and 
dependent gatekeepers). 
 26. See Cunningham, supra note 23, at 417–18 n.6. 
 27. Coffee, supra note 19, at 279–80. 
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ences, the term gatekeeper has assumed customary usage, not 
only in the academic literature but in official regulatory pro-
nouncements.28 
2. Whistleblowers 
Whistleblowers differ conceptually from gatekeepers. 
While gatekeepers generally work with enterprises to negotiate 
access to capital markets or deny it without further ado (keep-
ing information confidential), whistleblowers report violations 
to the public or to authorities.29 When gatekeepers determine 
that they cannot exercise internal influence to correct state-
ments that require correcting, they may resign or otherwise 
withhold their services. This does not, however, involve blowing 
a whistle to any enforcement authority or the public.30 The dis-
tinctive feature of the whistleblower, then, is that the third 
party discloses wrongdoing to authorities or third parties.31 
There are three recognized forms of whistleblowers. The 
first is the volunteer whose interest in whistleblowing is not 
based on any duty and does not lead to any reward.32 The clas-
sic example is the enterprise employee who comes forward with 
evidence of wrongdoing. This employee is protected under vari-
ous statutes against retaliation and is entitled to compensatory 
damages arising from costs of pursuing this redress. Notably, 
for employees, whistleblowing doctrines usually provide job se-
curity, and resist the enterprise’s temptations toward retalia-
tory discharge.33 
 
 28. See id. at 279 n.35 (citing Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Inde-
pendence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7870, 65 Fed. Reg. 
43,148, 43,150 (July 12, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240) (“[T]he fed-
eral securities laws . . . make independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the public 
securities markets.”)).  
 29. See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A 
GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES (2004) (discussing 
federal protections for whistleblowers who expose fraud). 
 30. See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Law-
yers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1019, 1028 n.30 (1993) (“While disaffirmance or resignation may have infor-
mational content in some cases, it is distinct from a pure whistleblowing obli-
gation.”). 
 31. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2245. 
 32. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to En-
courage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1126–31 (discuss-
ing the standard ‘anti retaliation’ model in general and its weaknesses in the 
particular context of capital market context). 
 33. See Rapp, supra note 2, at 112–16, 119–20. 
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The second form of whistleblower is the volunteer who 
shares in a bounty arising from blowing the whistle. Outside 
the securities context, the classic example is the qui tam ac-
tion.34 The most prominent illustrations are cases under the 
False Claims Act.35 Private parties are vested with authority to 
prosecute claims of violations of laws and share in the recovery 
on behalf of government.36 Analogous bounty schemes appear, 
including, in the securities law context, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s insider trading bounty program37 and, in 
the tax context, the Internal Revenue Service’s informant re-
wards system.38 
The third form of whistleblower is the nonvolunteer, who 
has duties to come forward and publicly disclose discovered 
wrongdoing. This type of whistleblower is also primarily a ga-
tekeeper but has specific additional whistleblowing duties. 
Consider, for example, auditors. The Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act (PSLRA)39 expanded auditor whistleblowing 
obligations, requiring the reporting of illegal acts within an en-
terprise and to the SEC if satisfactory responses are not forth-
coming from within the enterprise.40 
 
 34. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. 
L. REV. 381, 381–85; Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
43–45 (2002); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the 
Plaintiff, 1997 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 167, 167–70. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 201.61 (2006); see Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006). 
 38. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 733, Rewards for Information Provided by Individ-
uals to the Internal Revenue Service (rev. 2004), available at http://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p733.pdf. For analysis of these and several other federal boun-
ty programs, see Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dol-
lars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1141. 
 39. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000 & Supp. IV 
2006)). 
 40. See Kostant, supra note 18, at 1246. Notably, few reports have been 
made under this provision. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-982R, 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: REVIEW OF REPORTING UNDER SECTION 10A, at 2 
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03982r.pdf; John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1293, 1306 n.39 (2003) (citing SEC reports). Professor Coffee attributes this to 
either few actual problems or rationalized self interest. Id. at 1306–07. Anoth-
er likely possibility is the chaperon thesis, in which auditors observing prob-
lems get the problems corrected so the client can be admitted, not bounced. 
That is, the auditors perform their gatekeeping function first. See Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 62–66 (discussing “chaperoning” and “bouncing”). 
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3. Hybrids 
Despite conceptual distinctions, the categories of gatekee-
per and whistleblower can sometimes overlap and give rise to 
hybrids. For example, auditors can perform roles that include 
both gatekeeper and whistleblower functions. Suppose an audi-
tor determines that a client is committing illegal acts and the 
client refuses to redress the violations. The auditor must both 
resign from the engagement and disclose the illegal acts.41 
Thus, the auditor exercises both the gatekeeping function by 
refusing support and the whistleblowing by reporting the illeg-
al acts to the authorities. Lawyers may be seen either as gate-
keepers or whistleblowers in circumstances when their duty of 
client confidentiality comes into tension with their duty to 
avoid assisting in criminal or fraudulent activity.42  
The SEC’s struggle to formulate rules governing lawyer 
professionalism reveals the difficulty of classifying attorneys as 
either gatekeepers or whistleblowers.43 As adopted, SEC rules 
permit but do not require disclosing confidential information to 
prevent crime or fraud.44 That does not quite fit the typical 
whistleblower classification, the essence of which is reporting.45 
The SEC proposed, but did not adopt, the so-called noisy with-
drawal alternative, which contemplates a lawyer announcing 
publicly its resignation based on perceived client violations.46 
 
 41. Sec. & Exch. Comm., Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2006); Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78h-1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006); see Da-
rin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 57, 93–105 (2002); Kostant, supra note 18, at 1245–46. 
 42. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (construing 
and applying the “crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege”); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006); id. R. 1.13 (2006); RESTA-
TEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (2000); Tamar R. Birck-
head, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain Future of the Right 
to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (2006) (discussing critically the crimi-
nal conviction of a criminal defense lawyer concerning activities arising out of 
the attorney-client relationship); see also Richard W. Painter et al., Lawyer 
Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. 
REV. 225, 236–44 (1996) (exploring the imposition of affirmative duties on au-
ditors respecting steps to take when confronting corporate fraud and exploring 
how one would adapt analogous provisions for the legal profession). 
 43. See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 779–810 (2004) (discussing and analyz-
ing the “reporting out” concept). 
 44. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2006).  
 45. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2245–46.  
 46. Cramton et al., supra note 43, at 810–14 (recapitulating the analysis 
of the proposed noisy withdrawal concept). 
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This appears closer to the typical whistleblowing class,47 but is 
not quite whistleblowing due to limitations arising from the at-
torney-client privilege.48 
Nor do SEC rules as adopted embrace the gatekeeping 
model. Under the rules, lawyers must report violations to des-
ignated internal officials within the enterprise (“up-the-ladder 
reporting”) without necessarily reporting to outside authori-
ties.49 But other elements of the gatekeeping model are miss-
ing: up-the-ladder reporting does not include the standard ga-
tekeeping remedy of denying a client capital market access by 
withholding transactional support.50 So lawyers no doubt play a 
role in superintending capital market integrity, although it is 
not exactly clear whether they are gatekeepers or whistleblow-
ers or something more of a hybrid. 
B. CONDITIONS 
Law’s whistleblowing model is simpler than its gatekeep-
ing model. The former relies upon either payment or protection 
without venturing into the terms of the relationship between 
the actor and the wrongdoer. The gatekeeping model must not 
only design a relationship and specify duties, it must attend to 
the roles that reputation and liability play in its operation. 
Consequently, numerous conditions must be met for a gate-
keeping model to succeed. 
As a threshold matter, and in keeping with the metaphor, 
there must be a gate to keep. An enterprise has to traverse to 
access capital markets and there can be no other way through 
 
 47. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2246. 
 48. M. Peter Moser et al., Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or In-
formers?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 833, 848–49 (2004) (summarizing the grounds for 
objecting to the noisy withdrawal concept and reflecting on tensions with tra-
ditional values embedded in the attorney-client relationship). 
 49. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3. 
 50. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 1301–02 (distinguishing required up-the-
ladder reporting from “other, potentially more extensive gatekeeping duties”); 
see also Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sar-
banes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 315 (asserting that sec-
tion 307 and the part 205 rules give lawyers many ways to avoid reporting, so 
incentives have not changed much); Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 
550–58 (arguing that section 307 and the part 205 rules have flaws but bode 
well to improve normative self-conception of securities lawyers to assume the 
gatekeeper function); Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx 307’s Impact on Subordinate 
In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
559, 603–13 (arguing that the failure to distinguish and give special dispensa-
tion to low level in-house counsel is a defect in the part 205 rules). 
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it—at least some gatekeeper must tend the gate. Likewise, the 
gate cannot be opened absent a keeper’s volition. The metaphor 
attempts to capture initial offerings of securities as well as sec-
ondary market transactions and periodic reporting exercises. 
More fundamentally, the keeper must be able to influence 
the petitioner, to groom it for admission. For example, the third 
party must be able to promote fair reporting. That implies a  
universe of participants connected to initial, periodic, or trans-
actional reporting exercises. Federal securities laws have long 
imposed duties and associated liability risks on such persons 
and private and SEC enforcement actions make the risk real.51 
This approach can be justified by third parties’ enjoyment of 
low-cost access to information and can provide a “private moni-
toring service on behalf of the capital markets.”52 
Gatekeepers must be independent and possess sufficient 
stakes in their reputations as keepers to insulate them from 
petitioner bribes. Legal theorists emphasize that keepers can 
be effective when many petitioners seek entrance so that no 
admission fee (or bribe) can outweigh the expected costs of ad-
mitting the inadmissible.53 As Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. 
says, “At least in theory, a gatekeeper would not rationally sa-
crifice this reputational capital for a single client who accounts 
for only a small portion of its revenues.”54 
Thus the third party must be an “outsider” in the sense 
that it commands assets apart from the enterprise and its indi-
vidual members pursue careers apart from the enterprise.55 
This creates an incentive structure that differs from the enter-
prise and its employees.56 As Professor Reinier H. Kraakman 
explained in his pioneering analysis, third parties “are likely to 
 
 51. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 impose these duties and risks. Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. § 77k; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see also 15 
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (providing a basis for auditors’ duties of inquiry and disclo-
sure); 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000) (creating private rights of action against persons, 
including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially misleading 
statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC). 
 52. Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891.  
 53. See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
99, 146 (2001). 
 54. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1297–98. 
 55. Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891. 
 56. Professor Kraakman’s chief insight is that “whenever potential of-
fenders must employ incorruptible outsiders to gain legitimacy or expertise or 
to meet a legal requirement, gatekeeper liability will thwart a class of offenses 
that are unreachable through enterprise-level or managerial sanctions.” Id.  
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have less to gain and more to lose from [misleading reporting] 
than inside managers.”57 The stakes for these gatekeepers are 
influenced by both reputation and liability concerns, and gate-
keepers’ components can operate at the levels of individual ac-
tors, their firms, and entire professions.  
1. Reputation 
Enterprises accessing capital markets can use two reputa-
tions to signal reliability: their own reputations for candor and 
that of their gatekeepers for thoroughness and veracity. Enter-
prises seeking access, initially or as an ongoing matter, develop 
or have their own reputations for the quality of their disclosure, 
on the range from fair to misleading reporting.58 Candid enter-
prises enjoy more investor trust.59 The more valuable a reputa-
tion is, the greater is the cost of jeopardizing it through oppor-
tunistic abuse of that trust.60 
Enterprises can hire third parties to achieve similar pur-
poses. The enterprise can hire attorneys, auditors, underwri-
ters, and rating agencies to provide reports backed by their re-
spective reputations for thoroughness and veracity. Thorough 
and honest gatekeepers enjoy more credibility, which is a valu-
able trait. The more valuable it is, the greater the risk of repu-
tation loss so that, at some point, no additional incentives are 
necessary.61 
The more frequently firms are employed to serve as gate-
keepers, and the larger the number of repeat occasions in 
which they expect to play these roles, the greater the value.62 
Enterprises pay fees for this credence.63 Investors and other 
market participants appreciate these repeat engagements as 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: 
The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case 
for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 307–08. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id.  
 61. See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Lia-
bility Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 312 (1988) (arguing that reputations 
of auditors are sufficient so third-party liability is not necessary). 
 62. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 408–25 (1990).  
 63. Coffee, supra note 19, at 280 (“[T]he market recognizes that the gate-
keeper has less incentive to deceive than does its client and thus regards the 
gatekeeper’s assurance or evaluation as more credible than the client’s state-
ments.”). 
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valuable signals.64 When operating effectively, they contribute 
to a market in which securities prices tend to converge accu-
rately toward the fundamental value of the related enter-
prise.65 
Most gatekeepers are part of a profession that boasts its 
own reputation. An individual’s or firm’s membership in a pro-
fession creates an externality—each member of the profession 
exploits the profession’s reputation.66 An individual’s or firm’s 
investment in reputation should generate not only private ben-
efits for them, but also wider benefits for the profession. Thus, 
firms and individuals can free ride on the investments of oth-
ers. That result can have the effect of reducing incentives to in-
vest. The effect is dramatized by the presence of so-called buck-
et shops, or securities firms that engage in small-scale 
deception while benefiting from the securities profession’s 
broader reputation.67 The problem can also creep into law and 
public accounting practices.68 
Professions address these externality and free-rider prob-
lems through various strategies. First, professional member-
ship associations articulate professional codes of gatekeeper 
ethics or conduct. These codes effectively admonish that admit-
ting the inadmissible is simply wrong. Indeed, to some extent, 
the professional identities of lawyers and accountants are 
based upon such codes.69 
Second, such associations may provide or promote licensing 
or disciplining schemes that implicitly vouch for each gatekee-
per.70 For example, there are the programs overseen by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)71 
for auditors and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 618–21 (1984) (stating that investment bankers’ good reputa-
tions promote efficient markets). 
 66. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787–88 (2001).  
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 595, 629–32 (1993) (discussing lawyers as gatekeepers with re-
spect to contingent fees in criminal cases); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Re-
gulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 810 (1992) (noting that the ABA 
ethics code “constitute[s] the most influential source[ ] of professional norms”). 
 70. Black, supra note 66, at 788–89.  
 71. See generally American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
http://www.aicpa.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
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(NASD)72 for securities firms. Professional associations can po-
lice reputations of members and deny admission to unqualified 
applicants or expel noncompliant members. Resulting threats 
may improve a profession’s return on investment in reputation 
by individuals and firms. 
While profession-driven reputation protection can be criti-
cal, the professions have not proven particularly good at provid-
ing it.73 This mixed success could be due, in part, to how the 
professions’ toolboxes contain sticks and not carrots. True, li-
censes are carrots when first issued, as a badge of professional 
honor.74 But the threat of revocation is more analogous to a 
stick; enforcement leads to suspensions or expulsions. 
Even so, professional aspirations suggest the importance of 
culture and norms in any analysis of reputation as a constraint 
on gatekeeper performance. This constraint entails an enorm-
ously complex set of factors that is difficult to untangle and ex-
ceedingly difficult for law to micromanage.75 Laws can tinker 
with procedures and policies but these changes must be tai-
lored to the peculiar attributes of a profession and must be in 
tune with the idiosyncrasies of given firms and individuals.76 
There is debate about exactly what kind of reputation vari-
ous gatekeepers seek to maintain.77 For auditors, it is common-
ly said that an audit firm’s most valuable asset is its reputation 
for honesty.78 But as a matter of practice for effective auditing, 
 
 72. In July 2007 a new body, the Financial Industry Regulation Authority 
(FINRA), was formed to perform similar functions. See generally Financial In-
dustry Regulation Authority Home Page, http://www.finra.org (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2007). 
 73. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 788–89, 795–97 (discussing the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Ex-
change as examples). 
 74. See Black, supra note 66, at 788–89.  
 75. An abundant literature in recent decades explores the relationship of 
norms to law, how norms are formed, and their role in influencing compliance 
with law. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS (2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 177 (1999); see also infra note 235.  
 76. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral In-
quiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 
115–16 (1993). 
 77. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1828. 
 78. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“An accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely 
by its reputation for careful work.”). 
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an auditor’s reputation for toughness is more important.79 For 
lawyers, there is disagreement as to whether they seek to de-
velop reputations with managers for complicity and empathy or 
with external investors for performing any kind of gatekeeping 
function.80 
2. Liability 
An extensive body of literature dissects the components 
and effectiveness of first-party versus third-party liability en-
forcement strategies. First-party liability punishes the primary 
wrongdoer, and legal theory predicts a deterrent effect ex ante 
and a cost-internalization ex post.81 Third-party liability sup-
plements this device by addressing residual risks that the for-
mer fails to deter or internalize.82 It occurs when a third party 
is able to deter or coerce cost-internalization. Law exploits this 
ability by imposing liability threats on gatekeepers based on 
primary violations of their clients. 
Securities professionals are responsible for approving 
transactions, designing or opining on them or related disclo-
sure, and providing assurance and attestation of financial 
statement assertions. Failure to perform these duties triggers 
liability under various state and federal claims, a panoply of 
SEC administrative sanctions, and criminal action.83 In signifi-
cant part, these doctrines are based on a theory of deterrence, a 
negative injunction to discourage misbehavior.84 Scholars end-
 
 79. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Au-
diting and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 1698, 1726–27 (2006). 
 80. See Langevoort, supra note 76, at 101–11 (“In a representational set-
ting, a lawyer’s ability to detect client fraud is diminished by cognitive bias  
. . . . [Since] gatekeeper liability structures . . . generally are justified on the 
assumption that they provide incentives to careful client monitoring[,] lawyers 
with a diminished cognitive capacity for monitoring may not be the best can-
didates for that role.”); McGowan, supra note 4, at 1833–34. 
 81. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Mis-
conduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L. REV. 687, 
701–05 (1997). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Puri, supra note 53, at 148–52 (reviewing all these liability risks). 
 84. See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflec-
tions on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 674–76 (2002). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974) (intro-
ducing an economic analysis of the optimal level of punishment necessary to 
deter crime). 
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lessly debate and policy analysts endlessly tinker with the nu-
merous intricacies of this framework to seek its optimal struc-
ture.85 The following briefly highlights several examples. 
Some believe that the liability risk need not be as great as 
is traditional in the United States—a few high-damage law-
suits a decade are enough.86 Others believe that even less lia-
bility risk is necessary for lawyers, because they are naturally 
cautious by training, represent clients with liability risk on the 
line, and protect their reputations by keeping their clients out 
of losing securities lawsuits.87 Yet others cite the benefits of in-
creasing liability with a hint of incontestability. Thus, “[r]aising 
the penalties for both primary and third parties can be an effec-
tive way to make gatekeeping regimes work.”88 Professor Coffee 
states: “The more we suspect that attorneys will avert their 
gaze, the more we need to raise the penalties to deter them 
from so doing.”89  
The shape of liability exposure can be altered, as by ex-
panding the scope of gatekeeper duties or by broad interpreta-
tions of liability doctrines like “substantial assistance.”90 Or 
due diligence duties could be specified expansively. Third-party 
liability can be strict (under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior) or duty based (under the doctrines of aiding-and-abetting 
or negligent nondetection).91 
 
 85. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 
TEMP. L. REV. 451, 497–523 (2003) (conceiving regulatory compliance as 
another routine for an organization to be pursued the way other routines are, 
to supplement typical profit-maximizing and law-abiding images for a realistic 
appraisal); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of 
Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956–75 
(2003) (showing the limitations of rational choice and unconscious instinct 
models of obedience, the former due to biased judgment risk impairing calcu-
lability and the latter offset by competing social forces at subgroup levels such 
as corporate culture, and observing that additional incentives are supplied by 
private and regulatory enforcement). 
 86. Black, supra note 66, at 794–95 (making this argument for both ac-
countants and bankers). 
 87. Id. at 795, 800. 
 88. Kostant, supra note 18, at 1248 n.159.  
 89. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1306.  
 90. Langevoort, supra note 76, at 115. 
 91. Compare Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal 
for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540–46 (2001) 
(exploring a modified strict liability regime for auditors), with Coffee, supra 
note 24, at 349–54 (evaluating relative strict liability for auditors such as a 
limitation on liability based on an affirmative defense requiring proof of non-
negligence and good faith). 
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Some believe in the possibility of calibrating the duty to 
the penalties in optimal ways. This can be envisioned as a slid-
ing scale on which, as liability standards move from negligence 
to strict liability, associated punishment can be relaxed accor-
dingly.92 Others contend that an optimal regime would allow 
gatekeepers to negotiate client contracts that state the levels of 
review and assurance to be provided, along with express terms 
of liability exposure tailored to that performance.93 
Scholars debate the method and effectiveness of alternative 
means of enforcement. They debate the scope of private rights 
of action under section 10(b) or argue that stepped-up public 
(SEC) enforcement is superior.94 In this quest, the relative abil-
ity of enforcement authorities to learn of violations that war-
rant enforcement activity is also relevant.95 Damages caps and 
safe harbors are likewise debated, along with the role of insur-
ance.96 To conclude this nonexhaustive highlight of the many 
contestable parameters of system design, scholars debate the 
merits of enterprise liability against individual liability.97 
Finally, some believe that the corollary of liability regula-
tion works too. Consider the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
which address corporate criminal liability. While increasing 
sanctions on the guilty, the guidelines also reduce sanctions for 
 
 92. See, e.g., Kostant, supra note 18, at 1248. 
 93. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 
916, 951–58 (1998). 
 94. For a well-known debate along these lines, see generally Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994); Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995); and Joel Seligman, 
A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action 
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 438 (1994). 
 95. Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 102–08 
(2003) (providing a framework for choosing strict versus duty- or knowledge-
based liability according to how well-equipped enforcement authorities are to 
enforce violations—the less equipped, the greater the need for strict liability, 
and vice versa—and locating auditor performance under the knowledge-based 
end). 
 96. Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market 
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 657–62 (1996) (exploring parameters of 
potentially appropriate liability caps for nonprivity federal securities fraud 
cases), with Harvey J. Goldschmid, Capping Securities Fraud Damages: An 
Unwise Proposal in an Imperfect World, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666–67 (1996) 
(commenting on the foregoing article by Professor Langevoort and objecting to 
damages caps as risking the integrity of securities markets by reducing mana-
gerial incentives to promote faithful financial reporting). 
 97. See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 867–68. 
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those who actively seek to deter, detect, and disrupt criminal 
activity.98 As Professor Peter C. Kostant opines, “by greatly re-
ducing the penalties for corporations that detect and disclose 
criminal activities, and requiring directors to cooperate in the 
prosecution of wrongdoers, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
offer a ‘legal bribe’ to encourage gatekeeping.”99 These exam-
ples represent the progress achieved through incentive-based 
law, as compared to the in terrorem approach of liability 
threats. 
C. COSTS 
The benefits of the third-party liability regime discussed in 
the preceding Section carry a number of costs. First, associated 
duties entail time, effort, training and other costs of precaution 
and implementation. Even the best-laid execution will not pre-
vent misreporting. The fraud artists who pass through the gate 
undetected create additional costs in legal liability, borne either 
by the subject gatekeeper or by insurance.100 Litigation and 
administration costs are considerable, and include costs asso-
ciated with defending against nonmeritorious claims. 
Second, in some contexts liability risk can overshoot the 
mark. The risk of error may create excessive risk aversion.101 
Costs of a gatekeeper liability regime increase otherwise unne-
cessary compliance burdens on those predisposed to report fair-
ly. Further, third parties, reflecting their own liability risk, will 
charge a premium or require overinvestment in enterprise 
compliance and control infrastructure. Related costs can be 
passed on to enterprises, ultimately increasing their cost of cap-
ital; smaller businesses are invariably hurt disproportionately. 
Third, and given scant attention in the literature, while 
liability risk may deter, it may also make gatekeepers unwil-
ling to undertake functions that would otherwise be desirable 
for them to perform. For example, auditors have always re-
sisted accepting any undertaking to detect fraud or opine on 
the reasonableness of management’s accounting choices.102 Si-
 
 98. Kostant, supra note 18, at 1245 n.146. 
 99. Id. at 1248 n.164 (discussing the use of legal bribes to promote effec-
tive gatekeeping). 
 100. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 867–68. 
 101. See Choi, supra note 93, at 955. 
 102. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 168; infra text accom-
panying notes 197–202 (discussing the uncertain scope of an accountant’s obli-
gation to discover fraud). 
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milarly, lawyers resist the imposition of any obligations that 
even remotely threaten the jealously guarded attorney-client 
privilege and doctrines of confidentiality.103 
II.  FAILURE   
This Part reviews the literature that considers the episodes 
of financial misreporting of the early 2000s that illustrated the 
limitations on the traditional gatekeeping model. Part II.A dis-
cusses diminished reputation constraints that affected part-
ners, firms, and professions as a whole. Part II.B considers how 
reduced liability risk may have magnified these limitations. 
Part II.C explores systemic features that pose inherent limita-
tions for the traditional gatekeeping model. In each case, dis-
cussion indicates how these limitations endure despite various 
reforms that were made in response to the period’s transgres-
sions. The analysis concludes that diagnosis and reform invari-
ably focus on negative threats associated with reputation and 
liability risk, but that considering positive incentive programs 
may lead to better results. 
A. DIMINISHED REPUTATION CONSTRAINTS 
The third-party model requires incentives for gatekeepers 
to turn away the inadmissible (or for whistleblowers to turn 
them in). As discussed below, a series of factors limiting the 
power of reputational constraints during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s may have impaired these incentives at various le-
vels of partners, firms, and professions. 
1. Partners 
A common diagnosis of misaligned incentives considers the 
partner-level behavior of gatekeeper professionals. This consid-
eration makes the conventional supposition that it is irrational 
for a large firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its 
reputational capital for a single enterprise (such as Enron 
Corp.) but it may not be irrational for particular partners to do 
so.104 This situation occurs when individual partners have only 
one client, making their career depend on pleasing its man-
agement. 
According to this line of thought, “debacles like Enron’s 
were inevitable in an environment that rewards audit partners 
 
 103. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1846–54. 
 104. See supra note 14. 
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who are captured by their client and punishes those who report 
negative information about their clients through the proper 
corporate channels.”105 This diagnosis underscores the value of 
rewarding those who disrupt misreporting. 
A related diagnosis emphasizes how a firm that allows its 
partners’ careers to depend on a single client commits colossal 
error, compounded when the firm relies solely on that part-
ner—or a small coterie working with that partner—for infor-
mation about the engagement. Such a practice can impair the 
condition of independence necessary for effective gatekeep-
ing.106 Enron dramatically illustrated this problem.107 At min-
imum, these practices indicate inferior methods of internal as-
signment allocation. 
For lawyers, the one-client problem is less obvious, as most 
law firm partners provide specialized services to a broad range 
of clients.108 On the other hand, some evidence from the period 
indicated a decline in this constraint for other reasons, such as 
when lawyers’ compensation was paid, in part, in equity in 
their client firms.109 This problem could impair the reputational 
constraint at the partner level based on a desire to increase the 
value of that equity, either to increase personal or firm wealth. 
2. Firms 
For many decades, the reputational constraint, back-
stopped by a modest threat of legal liability, satisfied the gate-
keeper model’s requirements.110 But during the 1990s, a pillar 
of the reputational constraint changed, especially for audit 
firms. During that period, the percentage of audit firm reve-
nues from traditional auditing services shrank as revenues 
skyrocketed from consulting services (ranging from business 
 
 105. Macey, supra note 14, at 407–08. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 410. 
 108. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 1305–06 (noting that the one-client prob-
lem for audit partners can impair the reputational constraint at the partner 
level but also how this is not so at law firms).  
 109. See Puri, supra note 53, at 146; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert 
J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in 
Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 481–85 (2002) (discussing traditional gatekeeper 
liability theory and noting the controversy as to the suitability of lawyers to 
perform the function); Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, 
Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest in their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are 
“Selling Out,” Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 935–38 (2003). 
 110. See Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 1350. 
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strategy to technology management).111 The significant cross-
selling of consulting services to a firm’s auditing clients meant 
that auditors would lose considerable consulting revenue if 
they were to sever clients or blow the whistle on them.112 
Cross-selling essentially eliminated one of the vital gua-
rantors of auditor independence: the strong signal emitted 
when an auditor severs a client relationship.113 The signaling 
power when an auditor fires a client arises because the enter-
prise must have an auditor while the auditor need not retain 
any given client. Enterprises thus lose much more than the au-
ditor loses. They may be unable to find a replacement auditor 
at all after being severed. The auditor may even gain reputa-
tion value from this sternness, potentially enabling it to attract 
new clients.114 
Yet, during the 1990s, the incidence of auditor severing of 
clients declined due to shifts in power from auditors to 
clients.115 According to this diagnosis, the existing auditing 
structure “will not function properly until a lead audit partner 
can confidently fire a dishonest client without jeopardizing his 
career.”116 In the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became 
law, the number of audit firms that fired clients increased.117 
 
 111. PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
112 (2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/chapter5.pdf 
(showing a shift in the revenue mix of the five largest auditing firms from tra-
ditional auditing services to consulting services); Bratton, Shareholder Value, 
supra note 12, at 1350 (describing how fees from audit clients for nonaudit 
services rose from 13% of revenues in the 1970s to 50% of revenues in the 
1990s). 
 112. Professor Prentice documents factors that had the same weakening 
effect on other gatekeepers, including lawyers, analysts, rating agencies, 
bankers, mutual funds, and stock exchanges. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 
786–98. 
 113. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and 
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2002) (suggesting that the most important guarantor 
of auditor independence is the saliency of auditor terminations, a material 
event that must promptly be disclosed, but the value of which drops dramati-
cally when audit firms cross-sell consulting services, which gives auditors in-
centives not to sever clients). 
 114. The danger in this structure—also true of a rewards program—is au-
ditor strategic behavior, in which auditors fire entirely responsible clients to 
shine their image and attract other shinier clients. See, e.g., Macey & Sale, su-
pra note 14, at 1173. The effect, in any event, is a kind of balance of power be-
tween enterprises and auditors, one of “mutual reputation enhancement.” Id. 
 115. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 14, at 409. 
 116. Id. at 410. 
 117. See Coffee, supra note 24, at 348–49 n.148 (“In 2003, over 1460 public 
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It is hard to determine exactly why auditors increasingly 
severed clients during this period. Some evidence indicates a 
tendency to sever smaller enterprises as opposed to larger 
ones,118 even though all frauds that served as a catalyst for 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act involved large enterpris-
es.119 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley does not ban all nonaudit ser-
vices, leaving a large exception for auditors to provide tax ser-
vices to clients.120 These services are lucrative, but may 
increase the acute risk of illegality and fraud.121 Accordingly, 
while these reforms respond proportionately to a firm-level fac-
tor that reduced the reputational constraint’s power, more poli-
cy levers may need plying. 
3. Professions 
Auditing industry concentration may lead to an increased 
erosion of audit quality. Mergers during the 1990s reduced the 
 
companies changed auditors, which was the highest number in at least five 
years. Although such switches could be because the client was dissatisfied 
with the auditor, many were because the auditor considered the client too 
risky—or because the auditor raised its fees in light of that increased risk. . . . 
By itself, this evidence may not prove that auditors are becoming significantly 
more selective with regard to clients, but it is at least consistent with such a 
hypothesis.”). 
 118. An extensive contemporary and historical literature investigates the 
multiple aspects of auditor switching. For a recent contribution suggesting 
that increased switching after Sarbanes-Oxley is not strictly due to those re-
forms but at least potentially related to client size, and detailing a pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley study of switches during 1993 to 2001 showing that resigna-
tions of large audit firms commonly result in the client engaging another large 
audit firm, see Wayne R. Landsman, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Big N 
Auditor Switches (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=899544).  
 119. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhe-
toric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923–28 
(2003) (chronicling the road to Sarbanes-Oxley from the implosion of the “Big 
Four Frauds,” referring to Qwest Communications, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc.; 
Global Crossing, Ltd.; and Enron Corp., and noting that the statute takes the 
unusual step, for legislation, of mentioning the latter two by name). 
 120. See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a Trojan Horse in the Audi-
tor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 
485–502 (noting continuing auditor dependence on clients to whom they rend-
er tax services which are still allowed). 
 121. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336–50 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31–34 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(discussing facts at the preliminary stage of Internal Revenue Service and De-
partment of Justice investigations into criminal conduct at KPMG, which 
eventually led to the firm narrowly escaping a criminal indictment); see also 
Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 
TAX NOTES 201, 210 (2004).  
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number of large audit firms from eight to five and the dissolu-
tion of Arthur Andersen reduced the number further to the cur-
rent four.122 These firms are massive compared to the next 
largest firms; annual revenue at the four largest firms is ap-
proximately $20 billion compared to $1 billion for the next larg-
est firms.123 This concentration in the industry’s upper tier re-
duces the importance of product differentiation.124 With a large 
number of firms, competition can concentrate on product diffe-
rentiation, including investment in reputation; with so few 
firms, reduced competition diminishes incentives to invest in 
reputation and thus diminishes the power of the reputational 
constraint.125 
A final—and pervasive—limitation on gatekeeping efficacy 
is how the enterprise pays the gatekeeper.126 That creates an 
inherent inclination for solicitude simply to retain business. 
Numerous solutions to this limitation have been proposed, in-
cluding using insurance markets,127 public funding,128 stock ex-
change funding,129 or voucher financing programs.130 
None of these has been adopted in the United States. In-
stead, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adopts a more cautious ap-
proach. This reposes in an issuer’s board audit committee the 
authority to determine auditor compensation (and other audi-
 
 122. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 16, 20–22. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen 
Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of 
Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 297–98 (2004).  
 125. O’Connor, supra note 13, at 787–88; Prentice, supra note 13, at 786. 
 126. Coffee, supra note 19, at 279–80 (noting that gatekeeper utility is li-
mited since gatekeepers are paid by the party to be monitored). 
 127. Cunningham, supra note 23, at 427–41 (discussing a proposed alter-
native approach of authorizing companies to buy insurance and having insur-
ers hire and pay auditors rather than having companies hire and pay auditors 
directly). 
 128. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 n.180 (suggesting but discounting the 
possibility of having gatekeepers such as auditors paid through public fund-
ing). 
 129. Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 279, 289 (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for 
Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 76, 82–83 
(proposing the idea of having the stock exchanges coordinate and compensate 
auditors)).  
 130. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Fi-
nancing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 314–28 
(2003). 
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tor oversight, including retention and dismissal).131 One benefit 
of this approach is that audit committees can be conceptualized 
as gatekeepers, and there is some theoretical support for believ-
ing that having one gatekeeper pay another is an effective way 
to increase overall gatekeeping effectiveness.132 
B. REDUCED LIABILITY RISK 
Several legal changes during the 1990s reduced the expo-
sure of secondary actors to legal liability for failure to promote 
fair reporting. First, the PSLRA changed the liability regime 
from joint-and-several liability to proportionate liability so that 
gatekeepers no longer are liable for the entirety of damages but 
only for their share of culpability.133 Second, the Supreme 
Court held that the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws do not reach those who aid or abet others in misre-
porting.134 While this did not prevent SEC actions under that 
theory, it significantly curtailed private actions.135 Such 
changes reduced the legal liability threat, which could have 
been a factor in the declining propensity to protect reputations 
for integrity as gatekeepers (or whistleblowers).136 When com-
bined with the other factors noted above, incentives for quality 
gatekeeping declined.137 
 
 131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 
775–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 132. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 166–68; see infra text ac-
companying note 228 (noting that one feature of the rewards system is the 
possibility of securities underwriters paying bonuses to auditors). 
 133. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737, 758 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)).  
 134. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
164, 177 (1994). In March 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 
1873 (2007), and heard oral arguments in October 2007, giving the Court an 
opportunity to elucidate this body of law. See Linda Greenhouse, Skeptically 
Court Hears Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, § C. 
 135. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Audi-
tors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1650–51, 1656–57 (2006) (noting that the per-
centage of federal securities fraud class actions naming auditors as defendants 
decreased considerably since the Supreme Court announced that federal se-
curities laws do not authorize private securities fraud actions against those 
aiding and abetting securities fraud). 
 136. Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 1350 (noting that dur-
ing the 1990s, the legal liability threat to auditors declined and this, coupled 
with other factors, contributed to a greater willingness to risk the firms’ repu-
tational capital). 
 137. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 152–56; Bratton, Audi-
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A related diagnostic concerning audit firms is based on 
changing forms of liability structures.138 Audit firms shifted 
from partnerships to limited liability entities.139 This reduced 
incentives to maintain internal control, as litigation risk fell 
along with concern about steps that would reduce it.140 At least 
in the case of Enron, this diagnosis concludes, “[i]t seems 
doubtful that this situation would have existed if the firm had 
been operating under a legal regime in which partners were 
jointly and severally liable for negligence, audits were tied to 
reputation and not sold as commodities, and auditors were tru-
ly independent.”141 
Much more could be said about the sources of litigation 
risk and how they change over time through doctrinal evolution 
or regulatory reform. As the discussion of liability risk in the 
previous Section attests, it is notoriously difficult to use alter-
native legal designs to achieve desired results.142 It is particu-
larly perplexing to meet the specific objective of setting an op-
timal level of deterrence.143 
That discussion also shows that it is fair to say that the 
role of liability risk is a dominant feature of the scholarly liter-
ature. Perhaps more litigation risk helps to reverse certain 
causes of gatekeeper failure. But further discussion of that 
strategy in this review will not advance that cause. Indeed, the 
following discussion identifies systemic factors that impair  
gatekeeper effectiveness, most of which are beyond the influ-
ence of liability threats. 
C. SYSTEMIC FACTORS 
Systemic features of the gatekeeping landscape can influ-
ence its effectiveness. During the late 1990s two broad forces 
appeared to operate when considerable limitations in the gate-
keeper model appeared. 
 
tor Independence, supra note 12, at 470 (attributing the source of audit gate-
keeping deterioration to reduced liability risk and concomitant decline in audi-
tors’ traditional modes of independence and conservatism, plus the transfor-
mation of their consulting work into a high-return premium business carrying 
a suitably high risk for the auditor’s reputational capital). 
 138. Macey & Sale, supra note 14, at 1180. 
 139. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 447. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Macey & Sale, supra note 14, at 1181. 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 73–91. 
 143. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 60–61 (discussing the 
decline of deterrence). 
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First, the era was characterized by financial euphoria.144 A 
technological revolution occurred that altered means and me-
thods of doing business and of many forms of human activity. 
In this and other such periods, a critical mass of persons 
throughout all sectors of society—including enterprises and in-
vestors and their professional advisors and gatekeepers—came 
to assume that a new era had emerged, for which the tradition-
al norms of business and standards of accounting were less 
suited.145 It becomes easy in such periods to suspend critical 
judgment, even with conventional matters of corporate gover-
nance and financial reporting. Any gatekeeping model will suf-
fer serious stress in such periods.146 
Second, a systemic emphasis on gatekeepers can backfire. 
Gatekeepers stake reputations and liability only to the extent 
that there is at least a reasonable chance that misreporting will 
be uncovered in circumstances that damage reputation and 
create legal liability. But, especially during a euphoric period, 
and when gatekeepers are the centerpiece of a regime’s integri-
ty, professionals may believe that their transgressions can es-
cape notice. If the system relies on gatekeepers to promote fair 
reporting, and gatekeepers know that, it is not irrational for 
gatekeepers to believe that they can conceal complicity. 
For this reason, more elaborate gatekeeping theories em-
phasize using a multitude of gatekeepers as cross-checks, so 
that no one gatekeeper can ensure permanent concealment.147 
Alas, in euphoric periods, even a well-thatched mass of cross-
checking gatekeepers may have limited effect. Collective sus-
pension of objectivity can induce mutual myopia. For example, 
auditors may defer to lawyers who approve an approach to a 
reporting question while lawyers defer to the auditors who do 
so.148 
The bubble problem is recurring rather than continuing. 
Other cultural factors of a more enduring nature can impair 
gatekeeper effectiveness. It is critical to have individuals with-
in professional firms capable of advancing and protecting the 
firm’s reputation. This bonding is more likely in cultures where 
 
 144. See ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE passim (2d ed. 2005). 
 145. Cunningham, supra note 119, at 923–28. 
 146. See Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 470–71; Gerding, 
supra note 20, at 426–28. 
 147. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 333–61. 
 148. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business 
Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421, 1454 (2002). 
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individuals enjoy and expect to have long term relationships 
with a single firm. In recent generations, however, cultural 
forces have led to far greater mobility among professionals, like 
auditors and lawyers.149 They move from firm to firm more of-
ten than in previous generations. This mobility reduces the 
bonding between individuals and firms and related individual 
incentives to advance and protect firm reputations.150 
Bonding also was impaired when clients began to use dif-
ferent firms for different kinds of services more frequently; for 
example, when an enterprise that once used a single outside 
law firm for nearly all its legal needs increasingly began to use 
numerous different firms.151 That, too, breaks long term bonds 
that promote the advancement of reputations for candor and 
integrity in securities disclosure. Likewise, more frequent mer-
gers among professional service firms—now common among 
law firms—reduces bonding value.152 
Behavioral psychology contributes further explanations for 
why gatekeepers depart from the rationality-based assump-
tions of reputational constraints against misbehavior. First,  
gatekeepers may succumb to biases and use heuristics that 
prevent exercising best judgment.153 Among numerous exam-
ples are the self-serving bias and the commitment bias, which 
can afflict auditors, lawyers, and other gatekeepers. The first 
 
 149. See Frederick W. Lambert, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Transcen-
dence of Value Creation, 74 OR. L. REV. 121, 143–44 (1995) (noting the prac-
tice, beginning in the 1970s, of law firms recruiting associates laterally from 
other firms, the emergence of partner “books of business” that were portable to 
other firms, and the rise of placement services, a trade press, and financial 
pressures); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament 
of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor 
Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1624–25 (1998) (theorizing 
on the role of lateral movement among law firm associates). 
 150. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 149, at 1625–27, 1638–41. 
 151. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 893 nn.106–07 
(citing Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human 
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Part-
ners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 351–71 (1985), as “examining rela-
tions between structure of law firms and nature of client loyalty to individual 
partners” and “describing [a] law firm’s reputation as firm-specific capital 
which attracts clients and permits [a] firm to serve as [a] reputational inter-
mediaries on behalf of clients”). 
 152. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW 
AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.7.5, at 
2:132 (2d ed. Supp. 2005). 
 153. Prentice, supra note 13, at 786 (citing Brian W. Mayhew et al., The 
Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor Objectivi-
ty, 20 AUDITING, Sept. 2001, at 49, 66). 
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refers to a tendency to interpret data and assess uncertainty 
according to one’s own self-interest. The second refers to a ten-
dency to continue to believe positions one already has taken, 
which can induce continued confidence in mistaken beliefs in-
stead of corrections using new information.154  
Structural devices can address such biases. For auditors, 
self-serving bias can be neutralized by reposing auditor super-
vision in audit committees and commitment bias by rotating 
audit partners through different auditing engagements.155 It is 
harder to combat more general behavioral biases known as 
“backward recursion” and the “time delay trap.”156 These biases 
incline people to discount the significance of future events or 
circumstances, even those posing high-magnitude conse-
quences, and to value instant gratification at higher levels than 
equal measures of deferred gratification.157 
While all of the foregoing systemic factors contribute par-
tial explanations for gatekeeper failure, associated analysis and 
reforms tend to revolve around the scholarly literature’s endur-
ing focus on reputation constraints plus liability risk.158 These 
systemic factors seem to explain why reputation assumes lesser 
importance in certain market environments.159 Reforms tend to 
focus either on reinvestment in reputations or enhanced litiga-
tion threats.160 An important oversight in such a framework is 
 
 154. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Re-
sults: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 375, 410–11 (1997) (evaluating lawyer motivations); Donald C. Lange-
voort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and 
Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 654–56 (1997); see also John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 
1157–61 (1977) (describing gatekeeper malfeasance and legal theories availa-
ble in response); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the 
Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423, 445–65 (1978) 
(debating lawyers’ duties as gatekeepers in their capacity as corporate advis-
ers). 
 155. Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The 
SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 485–86 
(2001). 
 156. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 797–99. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 9 (explaining that 
“both strategies (i.e. both legal remedies and reputational intermediaries)” are 
important) (emphasis added); see also id. at 318 (contending that a “gatekee-
per’s willingness to resist pressure [from managers] will still depend on” liti-
gation risk and reputation loss).  
 159. See id. at 67–68, 318–24. 
 160. Id. at 318–24. 
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how liability risk can induce gatekeepers to invest, not in repu-
tations for effectiveness, but in campaigns to limit or eliminate 
the scope and type of their undertakings. 
Examples of how increased litigation risk results in gate-
keeper pushback include (1) for auditors, resisting any under-
taking to opine on the reasonableness of accounting principles 
that management selects or to detect fraud; and (2) for lawyers, 
resisting any duty to conduct due diligence or to opine on dis-
closure integrity to constituents other than a client’s board of 
directors (or, in some circumstances, a securities underwri-
ter).161 In each case, a “Catch-22” appears: without litigation 
risk, gatekeepers acquiesce, but with it, they want limited re-
sponsibilities. While a system reliant on reputation and litiga-
tion risk cannot unwind this conundrum, adding a carrot-based 
merit component to the system might help. 
III.  INCENTIVE REWARDS   
This Part explores how developing positive incentives or 
rewards can promote more effective capital market gatekeep-
ing. Part III.A outlines the intuition and sketches a formal gen-
eral model. Part III.B considers practical steps required to im-
plement such rewards. This emphasizes and illustrates private 
arrangements that can be designed to adjust existing incen-
tives. Part III.C turns to how public recognition can contribute 
additional incentives at very low cost. 
A. GENERAL MODEL 
This Section outlines a general model of incentives for  
gatekeepers. It begins with the intuitive motivation followed by 
an account of the model under assumptions of rationality and 
then under assumptions of behavioral economics. 
1. Intuition 
Popular corporate governance strategies include incentives 
designed to align principal-agent interests.162 The most conspi-
 
 161. Increased litigation risk also emboldens gatekeepers to lobby for other 
kinds of reforms, including, most commonly, calls to cap liability for damages 
arising from their own legal violations. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securi-
tizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on Damages, 49 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2007) (manuscript at 2–3, on file with author); supra 
note 96 (citing debate between Professors Langevoort and Goldschmid on the 
merits of liability caps). 
 162. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s 
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cuous of these are executive compensation packages tied to cor-
porate performance.163 Stock options are the most common form 
of these incentives. They epitomize the intuition behind any 
merit system: stock options give managers incentives to in-
crease stock price. Critics debate the effectiveness of these de-
vices, however, with some asserting that they overreach by 
tempting managers to provide misleading reporting to artifi-
cially inflate stock prices.164 
If the benefits of stock options are real, as devotees con-
tend, similar benefits should accrue from awarding analogous 
options to gatekeepers. If the deleterious effects of stock options 
are real, as critics claim, an ideal response is to offer counter-
vailing incentives to gatekeepers to neutralize those effects. If 
risk of misleading reporting increases in tandem with stock-
based compensation, a precise antidote is merit-based gate-
keeping to offset that increase. 
The intuition is akin to a hypothetical model of incentive 
compensation that Warren Buffett offered concerning invest-
ment banking services. At a symposium discussing how boards 
of directors assess mergers, Buffett considered the role that ad-
visors play, especially investment bankers.165 Many investment 
bankers charge contingent fees for merger transactions, giving 
them strong incentives to close a deal even if not in the client’s 
interests. 
 
Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 
138–44 (complaining that managerial pay was geared more towards organiza-
tional size than to performance, and urging more incentive-based compensa-
tion); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 227–42 (1990). Contra Brian J. 
Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 653, 653-56 (1998) (challenging the Jensen-Murphy thesis).  
 163. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiver-
sified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 3–13 (2002); Kevin J. Murphy, Ex-
plaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost 
of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 862–69 (2002); Michael C. Jensen & 
Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, 
What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, (European Corp. Governance 
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=561305.  
 164. See, e.g., WARREN E. BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: 
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 54–61 (2001); see also John Cassidy, The 
Greed Cycle: How the Financial System Encouraged Corporations to Go Crazy, 
NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 64, 64–73 (detailing the negative effects of 
executive stock options). 
 165. Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 719, 766–68 (1997). 
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To correct for this perversion, Buffett quipped as follows: 
“If I’m going to pay $5 million to somebody if they give me the 
advice and the deal goes through, then I think I probably ought 
to pay $5 million to somebody else whose advice I listen to who 
gets paid the $5 million only if the deal doesn’t go through.”166 
Similarly, if shareholders pay senior executives incentive com-
pensation to achieve designated corporate performance meas-
ures, they should be willing to pay gatekeepers incentive com-
pensation to assure those performance measures are achieved 
using fair reporting. 
This intuition can be amplified by insights that Professor 
Richard W. Painter contributed concerning law firms in merger 
transactions.167 Professor Painter noted that some law firms al-
so use contingent compensation arrangements, sometimes with 
disastrous consequences for shareholders. Professor Painter of-
fers the example of a $35 million contingent fee that Time 
Warner Co. paid to a law firm upon the closing of its merger 
with America Online (AOL).168 The price Time Warner paid for 
AOL in that merger was exorbitant and wound up costing its 
shareholders some $200 billion in investment value.169 As with 
Buffett’s quip about bankers, Time Warner shareholders would 
likely have benefited if the company paid one law firm $35 mil-
lion if the deal closed and another firm $35 million if it did not.  
This example furnishes additional intuitive support favor-
ing an incentives program for gatekeepers. Enterprises can 
promote effective gatekeeping by deploying two teams of law-
yers rather than one. Moreover, to correct this problem, Profes-
sor Painter advocated banning lawyer contingent fees in corpo-
rate transactions.170 This sensible proposal is akin to existing 
bans that prevent auditors from charging clients contingent 
fees.171 The underlying rationale is to impair managerial power 
to bribe gatekeepers into complicity. 
 
 166. Id. at 767. 
 167. Painter, supra note 14, at 412.  
 168. Id. 
 169. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Share-
holder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975, 982–94 (2006) (noting, in a comprehensive 
diagnosis of the transaction and background norms, that in the two months 
following the closing of the transaction, shareholders in the enterprise suffered 
losses of some $200 billion in market value plus several billion dollars more in 
civil liability costs). 
 170. Painter, supra note 14, at 412.  
 171. Id. at 411.  
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An additional step could strengthen gatekeeper effective-
ness. Contingent fees could be provided to gatekeepers (audi-
tors or lawyers) who discover and correct misreporting under 
circumstances when they otherwise have no legal obligation to 
do so. This would not require amending the ban on auditors 
charging contingent fees or interfere with imposing a similar 
ban on transactional lawyers.172 Auditors (and lawyers) would 
still charge fees for professional services as under current prac-
tice. They would also earn additional fees upon discovery of er-
rors or irregularities not otherwise within their existing re-
sponsibilities to uncover or disclose.173 
An incentives program can respond to some of the diagnos-
es of gatekeeper failure noted earlier in this Article. First, it 
generally is agreed that managers have considerable power 
over auditors who serve in a consulting capacity.174 Firing an 
auditor for being tough is a red flag to the market, but firing an 
auditor from its nonaudit services is not. Thus, managers of-
fered a carrot while holding out a stick: a favorable audit in ex-
change for lucrative consulting assignments. Auditors in the 
 
 172. See CODE OF PROF ’L ETHICS § 302, R. 302.01 (2006). This provision 
defines a contingent fee as “a fee established for the performance of any ser-
vice pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be charged unless a spe-
cified finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the fee is other-
wise dependent upon the finding or result of such service.” Id.; see Sankar De 
& Pradyot K. Sen, Is Auditor Moral Hazard the Only Reason to Ban Contin-
gent Fees for Audit Services?, 1 INT ’L J. AUDITING 175, 180–83 (1997); Ronald 
A. Dye et al., Contingent Fees for Audit Firms, 28 J. ACCT. RES. 239, 239–40 
(1990). 
 173. Professor Painter signals desire for reform using compensation sys-
tems, which is the basis for the mechanics of any merit system. See Painter, 
supra note 14, at 411 (explaining that problems associated with misaligned 
incentives between firms and partners “can only be corrected through struc-
tural changes within the gatekeeper firms themselves (e.g., risk management 
departments in audit firms, ethics committees in law firms, and reforms to 
compensation systems)”). 
 174. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 64; see supra notes 110–14 
and accompanying text. Legal scholars have expressed or implied a substan-
tial consensus that auditors rendering nonaudit services for clients impaired 
gatekeeping effectiveness. Notably, however, a few studies by accounting scho-
lars raise some uncertainty about how confidently this conclusion should be 
held. E.g., William R. Kinney, Jr. et al., Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Ser-
vices, and Restatements: Was the US Government Right?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 561, 
565–66 (2004); see also Jayanthi Krishnan, et al., Does the Provision of Non-
audit Services Affect Investor Perceptions of Auditor Independence?, 24 AUDIT-
ING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 111, 111–13, 130–31 (2005) (noting mixed results of 
empirical research on the effect of nonauditing services on auditor indepen-
dence and investigating whether investors perceive such an effect, as well as 
interpreting the results affirmatively). 
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consulting business may have offered favorably lax audits to 
generate more assignments.175 As Professor Coffee says, “the 
carrot works better than the stick, precisely because the threat 
to take the carrot away [can be] more credible.”176 
This insight suggests inverting the policy experience. If 
auditors who are paid bonuses to do consulting work became 
more lax on audits, then paying them bonuses for fraud detec-
tion and discovery should improve audit effectiveness. During 
the 1990s, firms adopted the business model that rewarded au-
dit partners for generating consulting work. It should be attrac-
tive to let firms adopt the business model that rewards audit 
partners for generating fraud-detection work. This would pro-
vide additional compensation for success in performing a 
watchdog function, and thereby supplement the existing regime 
that imposes liability risks. 
Second, a common diagnosis of the reputational constraint 
failure considers how a firm’s and a partner’s incentives may 
differ.177 Professor Coffee responds that, while plausible, this 
diagnosis is incomplete. If a firm really sought to protect its 
reputation, then it would control those persons through manda-
tory rotation of assignments or by imposing caps on nonaudit 
revenue they could earn.178 This response, which seems correct, 
also contributes to the intuitive case for creating gatekeeper in-
centives. If firms wished to pursue the ends as Professor Coffee 
hypothesizes, then an internal merit system, such as awarding 
points or compensation for fraud detection, should be attrac-
tive. 
Third, the standard conception of auditor reputation em-
phasizes investor assessment of auditor integrity—a conception 
that applies equally to other gatekeepers.179 So viewed, carrots 
play no obvious role because integrity reflects a “disclose if de-
tected” approach. But if one emphasizes a gatekeeper’s reputa-
tion with management for toughness, carrots become more ob-
vious tools. Given the inherent limits that gatekeepers face in 
testing the veracity of managerial assertions, reducing misre-
porting requires managers to believe that gatekeepers are ruth-
 
 175. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 64–65. 
 176. See id. at 65 (“Bribes work better than threats for a variety of reasons 
. . . .”). 
 177. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 178. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 318. 
 179. See supra note 78 (quoting Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in DeLio v. 
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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less. That reputation can be enhanced by rewarding them for 
successful detection and correction of misreporting. 
Finally, some believe that lawyers who were paid with 
clients’ equity securities suffered impaired judgment as a re-
sult.180 This can be akin to the downside of compensating man-
agers using stock options. While both tools can tend to align the 
interests of the gatekeepers/agents with those of the principal, 
they also can overreach and induce acquiescence in misreport-
ing. This likewise suggests inverting the experience. Instead of 
compensating gatekeepers in client equity securities, positive 
incentives should be offered in cash and paid as bonuses for 
discovering misreporting. 
2. The Model Under Rationality Assumptions 
A basic formal model of gatekeeper decision making com-
pares the gains from acquiescence to the expected costs of in-
culpation. An incentives program adds gains from vetogating to 
the model, which must be sufficient to tip the balance for both 
firms and individuals. The following discussion presents a gen-
eral model of this calculus, divided into three subparts: (1) a 
cost-benefit calculus; (2) the estimation of optimal gatekeeper 
payoffs; and (3) some alternative approaches and variations for 
specific situations. The discussion in this Section proceeds on 
the assumption of economic rationality among actors; the next 
Section considers the model under behavioral assumptions. 
a. Cost-Benefit Calculus 
Professor Kraakman’s original formulation of the gatekeep-
ing model identifies effective gatekeepers as those with incen-
tives that differ from clients in that they have “less to gain and 
more to lose” from granting capital market access to clients who 
misreport.181 Gatekeepers stand to gain the value of the bribe 
and stand to lose reputation value and liability costs. Neglected 
in this and kindred formulations is what gatekeepers have to 
gain from turning the petitioner away—true, they have to gain 
a good reputation with instrumental value. But just as the one 
side of the equation emphasizes “more to lose” in both reputa-
tion impairment and legal liability and the other side empha-
sizes “less to gain” from complicity, the formula should also 
emphasize “more to gain” from disruption. 
 
 180. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 181. Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891 (emphasis add-
ed). 
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A simple fact pattern illustrates this situation. In connec-
tion with a pending transaction, a corporate employee commits 
fraud (say booking false revenues). Gatekeepers participate in 
generating related documentation (say investment bankers 
draft, auditors certify, and lawyers finalize in disclosure docu-
ments). The gatekeepers have duties in respect of the transac-
tion and also opportunities apart from those duties to become 
aware of the fraud. For each, gatekeepers must decide whether 
to perform their duties (and, if they discover anything, to cor-
rect, disclose, or withdraw) and whether to perform additional 
tasks, not otherwise required, that may uncover it (and then 
face the same set of alternative decisions). 
In each case, a complex set of costs and benefits appear. 
Benefits of complicity at each step include fees from the pend-
ing transaction, the present value of probable future fees from 
other transactions, and any slice of the fraud such as bribes to 
acquiesce. Costs of complicity include the discounted probabili-
ty of inculpation. Following most gatekeeper theory, the gate-
keepers wish to preserve and promote a reputation for veracity 
and thoroughness and thus see complicity as a potential cost in 
reputation. In some cases, the gatekeeper may prefer a reputa-
tion for complicity and thus make the opposite calculation.182 
Setting those latter cases aside for the moment, the following 
formulation captures the elements of these decisions:183 
 
 BF < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]} 
 where: 
 
 182. It is possible for reputation effects of effective gatekeeping to be a 
negative. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1828, 1833 (contending that reputa-
tion effects of effective gatekeeping by lawyers can either be a benefit (if 
clients like reputable gatekeepers) or a cost (if clients like compliant gatekee-
pers)). If so, this makes for a difficult theoretical case about the possibility 
that lawyers can be gatekeepers. It runs counter to the basic theory of gate-
keeping. Professor David McGowan assumes that clients dislike whistleblow-
ing lawyers because it increases transaction costs. See id. at 1833. While ac-
knowledging the possibility that such action benefits clients by signaling to 
third parties a trustworthy client, Professor McGowan believes that if this 
were so, one would observe more whistle-blowing than we actually observe. 
See id. But this hypothesis seems to overlook how whistle-blowing is an ex 
post action whereas gatekeeping is an ex ante action. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 16 & 29. From this distinction, one might infer from relatively low 
levels of observed whistleblowing that high levels of effective gatekeeping ex-
ist.  
 183. Gerding, supra note 20, at 426–28. 
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 BF = benefits from fraud (of complicity in misreporting) 
P[d] = probability of detection 
P[e] = probability of enforcement 
L[l] = legal liability 
L[r] = reputation damage 
 
This formula expresses the relationship between the bene-
fits of complicity on the left hand and the costs of inculpation 
on the right. It captures how rational actors will facilitate mi-
sreporting when the benefits from fraud, BF, exceed expected 
total costs. Expected total costs depend initially on the proba-
bility of detection, P[d]. Assuming detection occurs, then ex-
pected legal liability is the product of the probability of success-
ful enforcement, P[e], and associated legal liability, L[l]. 
Expected total costs add reputation damage, L[r], to that result. 
Recall how assessments in the literature, including diag-
noses of the Enron era, highlight misaligned incentives and 
underdeterrence from inadequate liability risk.184 The foregoing 
formula captures these, respectively, in the magnitude of the 
benefits from fraud (complicity in misreporting), BF, and the 
magnitude of legal liability, L[l]. The misaligned incentives 
thesis as applied to gatekeepers supposes that BF was too high 
compared to L[r] and the legal liability thesis supposes that L[l] 
was too low compared to the optimal level. 
Recall also how the literature has said little about incen-
tive compensation from disrupting misreporting. The literature 
concentrates almost entirely on the misaligned incentives and 
legal liability theses. If carrots were added, the gatekeeper’s 
decision would include weighing the payoff that she would earn 
from disrupting misreporting. In the formula, this means add-
ing a new variable to the right side to capture this gatekeeper 
payoff, as follows: 
 
BF < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]} + GP 
where: 
 GP = gatekeeper payoff from effective gatekeeping (i.e.,  
 incentive payments received for disrupting misreporting) 
 
 
 184. See supra notes 104–43 and accompanying text. 
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For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, the components 
of this expanded formula will be referred to as follows: GP for 
these newly added gatekeeper payoffs, BF for the benefits of 
misreporting, and TC for the total expected costs of inculpation:  
 
[P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]}] 
b. Optimal Gatekeeper Payoffs 
The level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP) must be sufficient so 
that the benefits of misreporting are less than the sum of the 
total costs of inculpation plus gatekeeper payoffs from effective 
gatekeeping. In the formula’s terms, GP must exceed BF – TC 
(so that BF < TC + GP). 
The required gatekeeper payoff (the amount of GP) will 
vary with attributes of different professions, functions and en-
vironments. But to offer a sense of the parameters, it should be 
possible to hazard reasonable theoretical approximations of 
minimum and maximum levels. The minimum GP might be 
approximated by reference to a deciding agent’s opportunity 
cost—a portion of BF. A maximum level might be approximated 
by reference to the next best deterrence strategy. Appreciating 
that these are analytical and illustrative rather than scientific 
or definitive, consider each in detail. 
As to approximating the minimum gatekeeper payoff (GP), 
gatekeeping firms should compensate members to motivate 
them to build the firm’s long term reputation but, for firms, re-
tention requires meeting employee opportunity costs.185 A pro-
fessional’s opportunity costs—gains available from the next 
best option—are determined largely by the managers with 
whom she regularly interacts, meaning clients, whose assess-
ments of a professional’s reputation is significant (for example, 
they will be asked to provide references should the professional 
later seek new employment). This can put her allegiances with 
those persons, not with her firm. This increases the firm’s costs 
of monitoring her clients. To neutralize this, a minimum GP 
would be that amount necessary to bond the professional’s in-
terests to the firm’s long term reputation. In this approxima-
tion, that is the amount of those opportunity costs. 
In approximating the maximum gatekeeping payoff (GP), 
it must be no greater than the next best alternative strategy (if 
 
 185. Ribstein, supra note 129, at 288–89.  
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it were greater, then the alternative would be superior). For il-
lustration, among candidates for the next best deterrence 
strategy is a legal regime that imposes vicarious personal lia-
bility on partners of the deciding actor’s firm. Partner X is lia-
ble for violations of Partner Y. This increases Partner X ’s in-
centives to monitor Partner Y. But as Professor Larry E. 
Ribstein explains, “this liability may be ineffective because it 
places risk on those who are ill-situated to prevent harm.”186 
Thus, such a system of negative threats may create excessive 
incentives for internal monitoring and yet remain ineffective. 
As a next-best strategy, the alternative can be used to ap-
proximate a maximum level of gatekeeper payoff (GP). Using 
incentive contracts, Partner Y earns rewards that reduce the 
need for Partner X to monitor Partner Y. Rather than impose 
vicarious liability on Partner X for “wrongs” of Partner Y, the 
program awards Partner Y bonuses for “rights” that reduce 
Partner X ’s need to monitor Partner Y. The maximum GP, 
then, would be the cost to Partner X of engaging in such over-
sight (again, if GP were more than that, the vicarious deter-
rence alternative would be superior).187 
c. Other Approaches and Specifications 
Other avenues for estimating the parameters or ranges of 
optimal gatekeeper payoffs (GP) are possible. I provide the 
foregoing examples to suggest the model’s feasibility rather 
than to delineate it completely. In the same vein, it may be use-
ful to consider alternatives to the existing stick-oriented gate-
keeper regime and examples of specifications that may be use-
ful in developing an incentives program. 
As to approaches other than adding incentives for gatekee-
pers, some critics lament the limitations on the reputational 
constraint, which are manifested by the discrete and cumula-
tive failures of private gatekeeping. They prescribe displacing it 
altogether in favor of an emboldened public enforcement pro-
gram through a strengthened SEC.188 This is extreme because 
it removes other benefits of the private gatekeeping model, 
which is far less intrusive than would be an SEC or other pure-
ly public model.189 Perhaps it is a superior policy prescription. 
 
 186. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 429. 
 187. Again, these are approximations of parameters, intended to support a 
view of the model as reasonable, not scientific determinations. 
 188. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 797–800. 
 189. Regulators are not generally seen as private gatekeepers. See Oh, su-
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It is intended to increase the expected total costs of inculpation 
(TC) through regulatory empowerment. Yet it may be more 
prudent to continue to work with the existing model by adding 
gains from gatekeeping (GP) before taking such a radical move. 
It addresses the misaligned incentives problem by offering 
short-term personal gain not to be in on the fraud. 
Another alternative to adding gatekeeper payoff incentives 
is to manipulate the expected total costs of inculpation (TC) us-
ing devices other than cash. Professor David McGowan pro-
posed that securities lawyers who are first to disrupt misre-
porting be rewarded with transactional immunity from any 
related prosecution.190 This is a valuable contribution to the li-
terature. Yet it is a narrow change: it applies only to lawyers 
for a limited whistleblowing function and provides the carrot of 
lenity (which may be perceived as a lighter stick than a carrot). 
This Article is exploring a broader model for use by all gate-
keepers and contemplates paying cash (and providing other 
forms of public recognition as noted in the next Section). 
This exploration is thus more general, which means that 
the foregoing model requires specification for particular appli-
cations. First, it requires specification according to the profes-
sional identity of different gatekeepers. What works for audi-
tors may not work for lawyers. An important issue is how to 
interpret the reputational constraint. For auditors, all seem to 
agree that enforcement and compelling disclosure increase rep-
utation value whereas, for lawyers, scholars debate whether a 
reputation for complicity is more valuable than one for probi-
ty.191 In the foregoing model, this difference between auditors 
and lawyers concerns whether to locate reputation, [r], on the 
left or right side of the formula. While [r] ’s location influences 
the required amount of gatekeeper payoffs (GP), explicitly add-
ing that variable to the calculus is useful under either assump-
tion. 
An incentives program requires specification for variations 
among gatekeepers and whistleblowers (and hybrids). As tradi-
tionally defined, gatekeepers are present to prevent access to 
capital markets or to correct misreporting before granting 
 
pra note 20, at 755–66, 796–98 (discussing how public corporate gatekeepers 
such as the SEC can engage in more intense corrective efforts). 
 190. McGowan, supra note 4, at 1837–38, 1840 (proposing transactional 
immunity to the first securities lawyer to blow the whistle about an unlawful 
transaction). 
 191. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
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access.192 They bear duties to do so and may be more often ex-
posed to bribes for complicity. Whistleblowers traditionally re-
port after a violation has occurred and a party has passed 
through the gate and accessed capital markets.193 Whistleblow-
ers often do not have duties to report so those engaged in mi-
sreporting may be less conscious of the value of offering bribes 
to them. Accordingly, relationships between benefits of complic-
ity and costs of inculpation vary as between gatekeepers and 
whistleblowers (and hybrids). These differences do not alter the 
basic relationships between benefits and costs in the general 
model but would require specification for particular applica-
tions. 
3. The Model Under Behavioral Assumptions 
Turn from the rational cost-benefit calculus to some criti-
ques from behavioral economics. Professor Robert Prentice 
identifies two important behavioral limitations on the reputa-
tional constraint: backward recursion and a time delay trap. 
Both limitations can be neutralized using the right positive in-
centives.194 
First, consider backward recursion, where short-term re-
turns from dishonesty dwarf future benefits from honesty.195 
This problem is acute in certain settings, including end-game 
contexts (say, a person near retirement or a firm near dissolu-
tion), internal principal-agent contexts (where a firm’s reputa-
tion counts but an individual member gets little benefit from 
it), or when gains to individuals exceed probable future losses 
or through misestimation of any of these and related penal-
ties.196 
While an incentives program may not eliminate these bi-
ases—especially the risk of misestimation—it helps to counte-
ract them.197 It would increase the short-term returns from ho-
 
 192. See supra notes 16–28 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral 
Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1427–34 
(2002) (offering a critique of reputational constraint based on six countervail-
ing factors); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Inves-
tor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 786–806 (2002) (discussing res-
ponses to cognitive biases in investor behavior). 
 195. Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 39 
J. ECON. ISSUES 613, 625 (2005). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Biases may complicate estimating the optimal gatekeeper payoff (GP), 
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nesty. It can surgically respond to settings where risks of 
backward recursion are acute. For end-games, it increases re-
tirement resources and firm solvency; it closes the reputation 
gap that arises from misaligned incentives. If gatekeeper 
payoffs (PF ) are sufficiently large relative to the difference be-
tween benefits from complicity (BF ) and expected costs of in-
culpation (TC), positive incentives can reduce the risk of mises-
timation. 
Second, gatekeepers may suffer from a time-delay trap.198 
The trap arises when people over value instant gratification.199 
Gatekeepers may under appreciate the long term effects of 
building a reputation, which may take years, and thus delay 
gratification.200 This condition manifests in improper activities 
promising immediate payoffs if either detection is unlikely in 
the long term or the long term is sufficiently distant to be dis-
counted into immateriality. Self-serving bias can exacerbate 
this condition when people assess information supporting self-
interest, as by rationalizing fraudulent schemes. Carrots coun-
teract these biases. Cash paid today offsets the discounting ef-
fect by providing gatekeepers immediate rewards. Cash com-
pensates gatekeepers for not being in on a scheme, and thus 
reduces the likelihood that they will overlook the long term 
risks of liability. 
Professor Painter notes that regulations do little to address 
cognitive biases gatekeepers may face.201 For example, com-
mitment bias can induce auditors to hide post-reporting disco-
veries or induce lawyers to adhere to previous assessments of 
the probability of litigation outcomes despite new information 
tending to contradict the assessment.202 The resulting biased 
judgments can infect related disclosure. Possible solutions in-
clude the use of audit committees as auditor supervisors, as re-
quired by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or obtaining a second law-
yer’s opinion (an option but not a regulatory requirement). 
 
but that is also true of estimating other components of the model under ratio-
nality assumptions. 
 198. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 798. 
 199. See id.; see also Manuel A. Utset, Model of Time-Inconsistent Miscon-
duct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319, 1343–48 
(2005) (arguing that lawyers engage in repeated misconduct because they val-
ue immediate gratification). 
 200. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 798. 
 201. Painter, supra note 14, at 413–15. 
 202. Id. at 414. 
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Neither solution is perfect or complete, but adding an incen-
tives program can reduce the imperfections further.203 
B. PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS 
If the intuition and formal general model are potentially 
appealing conceptually, it remains to consider practical steps 
necessary to implement it. The following discussion considers 
private arrangements for lawyers and auditors, surveying ser-
vices that an incentive program might encompass and sketch-
ing some parameters of how private contractual arrangements 
can be designed to fund and execute them. 
1. Services 
Rewards concentrate on functions that would be productive 
for gatekeepers to perform, although not otherwise required by 
law. This category can be large and exists, in part, because of 
gatekeepers’ reluctance to accept categorical exposure to liabili-
ty for undertaking associated functions. The following illu-
strates some services that the program could encompass. It 
classifies them for convenience into two categories: investiga-
tion and certification. Examples of each are provided for both 
lawyers and auditors. 
a. Investigation 
For lawyers, a good illustration of investigation services 
concerns due diligence exercises. Laws permit, but do not re-
quire, lawyers to perform due diligence in numerous capital 
market transactions, from underwritten public offerings to 
change of control arrangements. Lawyers conduct due diligence 
because performance creates a defense against securities law 
liability.204 Failure to perform, or failure to discover problems 
 
 203. It is foolish to conjecture how a carrot-based merit system would in-
fluence collective behavior during a market bubble such as that fueled by 
technological change during the late 1990s and 2000s. See supra notes 144–46 
and accompanying text. Given how episodes of financial euphoria recur, it 
seems doubtful that any system design feature can mediate them (yet regula-
tory change in response to fallouts from financial euphoria likewise recurs). 
See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evi-
dence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850–51 (1997) (noting that new securities regula-
tion tends to follow crashes); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 77, 83–96 (2003) (discussing securities regulation enacted following the 
market crashes of 2002, 1929, and the South Sea Bubble). 
 204. See 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4259 
n.151 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that the so-called due diligence obligation is not an 
affirmative duty but a defense). 
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and disrupt access to capital markets, does not, ipso facto, ex-
pose lawyers to liability.205 However, lawyers are component to 
perform the exercise and sometimes are expressly retained to 
do so, such as when an enterprise attempts to detect specific 
misconduct that has come to its board’s attention.206 
For auditors, a good illustration of investigation services 
concerns fraud detection. Auditors conduct full-scale audits of 
clients but are not strictly obligated to search for fraud.207 Fail-
ure to discover fraud does not, in itself, expose auditors to legal 
liability. Professional auditing standards articulate a modest 
measure of obligation to detect fraud, but its exact scope as a 
matter of law is contested and uncertain.208 As a result, its ex-
ecution in practice is limited.209 Auditors prefer to deny having 
any duties that would flow from a broad interpretation of the 
 
 205. See Ben D. Orlanski, Whose Representations Are These Anyway? At-
torney Prospectus Liability After Central Bank, 42 UCLA L. REV. 885, 904–05 
(1995) (noting incorrect but common judicial rhetoric characterizing the due 
diligence defense as somehow involving an “affirmative duty”). 
 206. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 1003 (N.Y. 1979) 
(noting how the audit committee of General Telephone & Electronics Corpora-
tion’s board of directors retained the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, 
Cutler & Pickering to conduct an internal investigation growing out of the for-
eign bribery scandals of the 1970s); see also Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Cor-
porate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 666–78 (1984) (providing numer-
ous illustrations of self-investigation and its origins as well as assessing its 
benefits and costs).  
 207. See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors 
Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1147–50, 1155 (2007) (elaborating 
upon ways that professional auditing standards prevent the imposition of legal 
liability for the nondetection of fraud). 
 208. Reflecting both the stakes and the controversy, accounting standard-
setters have rewritten the applicable auditing standards on numerous occa-
sions. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (Am. Inst. of Certified Public Ac-
countants 2002). The current standard mainly elaborates on the difficulties 
auditors face in detecting fraud rather than specifying anything resembling a 
duty to investigate or proactively detect it. See id. ¶¶ 5–12. For analysis of 
predecessor formulations, see Mark F. Zimbelman, The Effects of SAS No. 82 
on Auditors’ Attention to Fraud Risk Factors and Audit Planning Decisions, 35 
J. ACCT. RES. 75, 86–94 (1997) (concluding that despite increased attention 
toward fraud risk, auditors will not change their audit plans to effectively 
detect fraud). 
 209. See Sean M. O’Connor, Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestab-
lishing Audits as Control and Premium Signaling Mechanisms, 81 WASH. L. 
REV. 525, 582–83 (2006) (arguing in support of prescription to replace the 
United States mandatory statutory audit with a shareholder-driven audit, and 
arguing that the “general purpose audit” is “not a very effective device,” par-
ticularly compared to a forensic audit). 
CUNNINGHAM_6FMT 1/22/2008 12:13 PM 
2007] REWARDING EFFECTIVE GATEKEEPERS 367 
 
standard.210 Nevertheless, auditors sometimes assume express 
contractual duties to investigate for fraud, such as when they 
are engaged to conduct forensic audits.211 Auditors actively 
promote the value of this service.212 As with lawyers who un-
dertake contractual duties to conduct due diligence, this signals 
that auditors command the professional skills and ingenuity 
required to perform this service. 
b. Certification 
Written legal opinions are examples of certification servic-
es that lawyers provide. Lawyers often provide these to clients 
for various securities-related matters and sometimes prepare 
them for others at a client’s request.213 A common example oc-
curs when an underwriting agreement conditions the underwri-
ter’s duty on receiving an opinion from issuer’s counsel concern-
ing the legality of the transaction and compliance, as to form, 
with federal securities regulations. 
Lawyers’ opinions tend to be narrowly drawn and ad-
dressed. They invariably provide “negative assurance.”214 The 
opinion usually states that the firm conducted investigations it 
deemed necessary and that nothing came to its attention that 
would prevent it from opining that the transaction is lawful 
and that disclosure is in conformity with regulations.215 Re-
liance is expressly limited to addressees, usually a client’s 
 
 210. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 138–46 (“[T]he battle 
lines seem to have been drawn: the profession is content with an emphasis on 
internal controls, while reformers want enhanced standards requiring the au-
ditor to recognize a responsibility to detect material fraud. For the profession, 
this latter priority carries the prospect of greater litigation exposure.”). 
 211. See Vinita Ramaswamy, Corporate Governance and the Forensic Ac-
countant, CPA J., Mar. 2005, at 68, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/ 
cpajournal/2005/305/essentials/p68.htm. 
 212. See Samuel A. DiPiazza et al., Global Capital Markets and the Global 
Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks 13 
(2006), http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf (noting 
the proposal of large audit firms advocating mandatory forensic audits of all 
public companies on a random or periodic basis). 
 213. See SCOTT FITZGIBBON & DONALD W. GLAZER, FITZGIBBON AND GLAZ-
ER ON LEGAL OPINIONS: WHAT OPINIONS IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS SAY 
AND WHAT THEY MEAN 1–4 (1992); Jonathan M. Barnett, Degenerate Certifica-
tion: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional Curiosities, J. CORP. L. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2007). 
 214. See Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions, ABA 
Section of Business Law, Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 1513 passim (2004). 
 215. Id. 
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board of directors (or, sometimes, an underwriting firm of a 
client’s securities). Apart from contractual requirements and 
modest risk of liability such as negligent misrepresentation, 
failure to provide an opinion does not expose a firm to legal lia-
bility or even reputational damage.216 
Written comfort letters are examples of auditors’ certifica-
tion services. In securities underwriting, an underwriter’s obli-
gations are conditioned on receipt of a designated comfort letter 
from the issuer’s auditors. As with lawyers’ opinions, these pro-
vide negative assurance and do not require the auditor to con-
duct any particular investigation.217 In present practice, evi-
dence suggests that auditors expressly disclaim any specific 
responsibility for detecting fraud, echoing the profession’s more 
general aversion to accepting such duties.218 
c. Why Law Does Not Mandate These Services 
Law could require that gatekeepers render investigation 
and certification services of the kind just described. It could 
mandate that lawyers perform due diligence in securities 
transactions and provide formal written certifications to desig-
nated transaction participants, including investors.219 It could 
require that those certifications state affirmatively that disclo-
sure is fair and accurate in all material respects. Laws could 
clarify that auditors are responsible for detecting fraud and re-
quire that they provide specific positive assurance to underwri-
ters or other transaction participants. But laws have not done 
so and probably for good reasons. 
First, such blanket mandates may demand more than is 
necessary. Not all enterprises require comprehensive gatekee-
per vetting.220 Second, those mandates might demand more 
 
 216. For a primer on the subject of lawyers’ legal opinions (i.e., addressing 
contexts beyond that of capital market gatekeeping), see Jeffrey Smith, A Le-
gal Opinion Malpractice Primer, in THE LEGAL OPINION COMMITTEE WORK-
SHOP 2005, at 165 (2005). 
 217. Auditing regulations govern the preparation, scope, and delivery of 
comfort letters. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCE-
DURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 72 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Acc-
toutants 1993); see also William J. Whelan, III, Accountant Due Diligence and 
Comfort Letters, in SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2007: OPERATING UNDER THE NEW 
RULES 403 (2007) (providing practice perspective on auditors’ comfort letters). 
 218. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 166, 168 (discussing how the 
auditing profession is “refus[ing] to discuss the prospect for fraud or illegality 
with other gatekeepers”). 
 219. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1310–11, 1313 n.57. 
 220. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corpo-
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than is possible. Fraud and other sources of misreporting can 
be hidden in ways that no professional could discover.221 Risks 
of error can be so high that the expected costs to the profes-
sionals exceed the price that they could charge for backstopping 
their opinions. As a result, the professions resist accepting such 
duties as a political matter.222 This implies, however, that the 
threat of legal liability can backfire. Auditors and lawyers have 
a comparative advantage to investigate and certify yet, under 
the existing regime, these services may be rendered on subop-
timal terms.223 Designing a system in which auditors and law-
yers would agree to perform these functions—without fear of 
legal liability—is thus appealing. 
2. Contracts  
Contracts are useful devices to induce gatekeepers to rend-
er investigation and certification services. The following discus-
sion presents some requirements to promote contract effective-
ness, evaluates possible contractual arrangements and 
incentives, and notes the risk of creating excess incentives. 
a. Requirements 
Effective contracting to make a positive incentives program 
useful probably requires at least the following attributes. First, 
the program’s strength depends on generating and channeling 
sufficient funds to gatekeepers.224 Compensation must be suffi-
cient to fund an optimal level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP). The 
 
rate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1065 (1993). 
 221. See, e.g., Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12882, 2007), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12882.pdf (presenting an empirical 
study of fraud detection covering 1994 to 2004, finding multiple sources of dis-
covery, including internal and external sources, and concluding that “mone-
tary incentives for detection in frauds against the government influence detec-
tion without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting gains from extending such 
incentives to corporate fraud more generally”). 
 222. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 166, 168. 
 223. The greater the professional resistance to a broad mandate, the more 
likely it is suited to an incentives program. Performing the function successful-
ly yields bonus payments, whereas either not performing the function or doing 
so unsuccessfully does not expose the gatekeeper to legal liability or even re-
putational harm. If experience using incentive devices is favorable, it could be 
possible to substitute that approach for existing mandatory duties backed by 
liability imposition. 
 224. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 369–70 (observing that 
“[c]arrots, as well as sticks, then must be used” and that a challenge is to find 
“funding . . . to subsidize” these incentives). 
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challenge is finding the funding. Ideally, funds would draw on 
resources that already exist in the capital formation process. 
One possibility, discussed below, is contractual reallocation of 
deal cash flows, chiefly from issuers and underwriters to audi-
tors and lawyers. 
Second, the program should satisfy the requirements of a 
signaling equilibrium. The strength depends, in part, on disse-
mination of information about it to capital market partici-
pants.225 The contracts provide signals to market participants; 
enterprises giving gatekeepers incentives to disrupt misreport-
ing should benefit from lower costs of capital compared to those 
unwilling to do so.226 Signals work when the cost of signaling 
varies inversely with actual quality (i.e., it costs more for lower 
quality actors to signal; if it were cheaper to do so, everyone 
would signal and the value would plummet).227 An incentives 
program would satisfy this condition because it would impose 
costs on low quality signalers that they would be unwilling to 
pay. 
Third, all incentive-based exercises that gatekeepers un-
dertake would be optional. Services that gatekeepers are oth-
erwise legally required to perform are outside its scope. This 
triggers a related final requirement that judicial interpretation 
of resulting agreements should be strict. A law or auditing firm 
that expressly agrees to examine an enterprise to uncover mis-
reporting, but fails to do so, should not face liability if the ex-
press terms of the contract do not carry any guarantee of per-
formance. Litigation risk must not be so high that the expected 
liability costs of undertaking the optional functions exceeds the 
fair market contract price for undertaking them. 
b. Modifying Present Practice 
Modest modification to present practice would enable the 
implementation of positive gatekeeper incentives meeting the 
foregoing requirements. The following is intended to illustrate 
 
 225. Confidential incentive contracts could result in more effective gate-
keeping (through discovery and correction of misreporting), but their value 
should increase if they are widely publicized.  
 226. Cf. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 14, at 410 (noting a 
proposal by the pension funds in New York and North Carolina to award bro-
kerage business only to firms having adopted internal mechanisms to reduce 
conflicts of interest). 
 227. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); 
Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of 
Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434, 448 (2002). 
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one context in which this could work—without meaning to be 
exhaustive.228 Take the examples given in Part III.B.1 concern-
ing lawyers’ opinion letters and auditors’ comfort letters. Both 
are products of underwriting agreements and reflect that those 
professionals conducted investigations they deemed necessary 
and that nothing came to their attention to prevent providing 
the certification. The professionals earn their fee as a result, in 
accordance with their retention or engagement agreements 
with issuers. 
Under positive incentive contracts, in contrast, the profes-
sionals would agree with issuers to undertake the investigative 
functions and earn compensation to the extent, and only to the 
extent, that the investigation results in discoveries of misre-
porting. The important negotiated provisions would address 
compensation, delineate the activities or discoveries that gen-
erate it, and reference verification measures. In the best scena-
rios, those discoveries would result in correction and still ena-
ble the issuer to access capital markets; but the gatekeepers 
would also be paid in cases where their discoveries led to deny-
ing that access. All participants in the transaction—
underwriters, issuers, auditors, and lawyers—have incentives 
to enter into these arrangements.  
For underwriters, there are several incentives to modify 
existing arrangements in favor of this kind of program. First, 
the program need not replace the existing conditions set forth 
in underwriting agreements that generate negative assurance. 
Second, underwriters are gatekeepers too, and face reputation 
and liability constraints elaborated in the traditional gatekeep-
 
 228. Professors Hamdani and Kraakman’s analysis of rewards for outside 
directors suggests additional alternatives that could be adapted to other gate-
keepers. For example, they propose to reward directors who resign under pro-
test when legitimately objecting to corporate wrongdoing. See Hamdani & 
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 1703–05. That could be adapted to reward audi-
tors who resign from an engagement under stated circumstances. As another 
example, they propose a rule of reverse negligence that rewards directors who 
show that they discharged their duties despite a triggering event such as mi-
sreporting. See id. at 1691–93. They note that this could be adapted for audi-
tors into a reverse strict liability rule under which auditors would be entitled 
to recover rewards despite misreporting by showing that they were not re-
sponsible for it. See id. at 1711. These examples, as with those in the text, are 
naturally nonexhaustive, as this literature is just emerging. See id. (“We list 
these possibilities not because we endorse them, but because they demonstrate 
that augmenting the traditional liability regimes with a full set of possible le-
gal sanctions, both negative and positive, can provide potentially valuable 
tools for fixing the incentives of gatekeepers that have not yet been analyzed—
or even imagined.”). 
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ing model. They can protect reputation and reduce liability risk 
by increasing the effectiveness of their fellow gatekeepers. Cur-
rent evidence indicates that underwriters are seeking to have 
auditors perform such functions but auditors are unwilling to 
do so.229 An incentives program can break the resulting stale-
mate. Accordingly, it should be desirable, in principle, for un-
derwriters to agree with issuers to create optional opportunities 
for their fellow gatekeepers to actively seek to discover and cor-
rect misreporting. 
Most issuers should find this strategy attractive. True, en-
terprises that are institutionally dedicated to misreporting 
would find the proposal repellant. But the resulting differentia-
tion among issuers creates the required signaling equilibrium 
to increase the program’s strength. For investors, this would 
separate enterprises according to the relative probability that 
their reporting is fair compared to misleading.230 
Furthermore, while difficult to verify empirically, it does 
not seem common for entire enterprises to be institutionally 
dedicated to misreporting; more commonly, individual agents 
within an enterprise wish to misreport. In either case, the re-
forms made in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act create internal gover-
nance structures associated with boards of directors that can be 
useful.231 Willingness to adopt arrangements to implement 
such a structure would likely have to originate with an issuer’s 
board of directors, although it is not impossible to believe that 
senior executives would find it attractive, so long as they are 
not among an inner circle committed to deception.232 
Within issuers, audit committees should support and be 
able to develop gatekeeper incentives. Many believe that the 
 
 229. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 230. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–89 (1970). 
 231. These include requirements imposed respecting the composition and 
duties of board audit committees. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–77 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Governance requirements previously 
established by stock exchanges concerning audit committee composition, char-
ters, and duties enhance the capabilities of audit committees to pursue a car-
rot system to promote gatekeeping effectiveness. See NASD, Inc., By-Laws, 
Article IX, § 5 (2001); NASD, Inc. Manual R., 4350(d)(1)-(2) (2002); NYSE, 
Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303.01(B)(2)(a), 303.01(B)(2)-(c) (2007). 
 232. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering 
Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 538–39 (2004) (discussing the 
group psychology of corporate inner circles that often opposes whistleblowing 
activities). 
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most important of the changes in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the 
creation of audit committee power over auditors.233 The law re-
poses in audit committees the power to select, compensate, su-
pervise, and terminate auditors, as well as more power over the 
selection of appropriate accounting principles through a formal 
role in resolving disagreements between management and au-
ditors and expressly empowering audit committees to retain 
independent counsel and other advisors.234 Audit committees 
now wield considerable influence in the audit function and 
could easily develop incentive contracts and other programs to 
promote effective gatekeeping, by both auditors and lawyers.  
For audit committees who believe that the rewards ap-
proach is conceptually appealing in principle, this aspiration 
can be stated expressly as part of the audit committee’s char-
ter. To the extent that the issuer assumes responsibility to fund 
bonus compensation that lawyers or auditors earn in the exer-
cise, they should be able to command requisite resources inter-
nally from the enterprise under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s pro-
visions requiring that issuers give audit committees a sufficient 
budget.235 Committees can argue, credibly, that associated costs 
will be vastly outweighed by saving the costs of later-discovered 
misreporting. 
The issuer would not have to fund 100 percent of the 
awards. Award funding would be subject to negotiation be-
tween the issuer and underwriter. The issuer could agree to 
pay all bonus compensation or the issuer and underwriter could 
agree to share designated portions. Funding a portion of the 
payout will be appealing to the underwriter according to its cal-
culations, under the traditional gatekeeping model, of reputa-
tion and liability costs that result from later-discovered misre-
porting. 
Triggers for the awards would likewise be subject to nego-
tiation. They would specify threshold levels necessary to earn 
compensation and specify kinds of error or irregularity that are 
included and excluded. Parameters would reflect the difference 
between activities that a gatekeeper is otherwise obligated to 
perform under existing law and those that it is contractually 
 
 233. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 367; William W. Bratton, 
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 
48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2003). 
 234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301; see Bratton, supra note 233, at 
1035. 
 235. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.  
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undertaking to perform. In delineating these boundaries in the 
underwriting agreement, all participants—issuers and under-
writers as well as auditors and lawyers—would contribute to 
negotiations. 
Resulting incentives should make this approach enticing to 
auditors and lawyers. Auditing and law firms could increase its 
appeal and effectiveness by designing internal compensation 
systems through which the contingency payments for discovery 
are channeled to appropriate personnel. Among other contribu-
tions, this would facilitate the prescription, noted earlier, to 
create mechanisms that support channeling negative informa-
tion through a chain of reporting.236 The philosophical aspects 
of a positive incentives program could be reflected within such 
firms in compensation systems. At present, audit firm partner 
compensation is tied to generating revenues from consulting or 
auditing work and, since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, 
on designing and testing systems of internal control. The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) encourages 
firms to allocate resources and compensation to functions de-
signed to improve auditors’ technical competence.237 Without 
diminishing the importance of these ways of allocating re-
sources, sufficient flexibility appears that would enable com-
pensation systems to channel gains from effective gatekeeping 
to responsible partners. The same should be true of law firms. 
c. Risk of Excess Incentives 
Contracts designed to create incentives for effective gate-
keeping require attention to the (ironic) risk that gatekeepers 
will fabricate misreporting to obtain additional compensation. 
As a theoretical matter, this risk also exists in the current rep-
utation-and-liability model of gatekeeping. Auditor reputations 
increase in value by repeated demonstrations of integrity, 
whether this is achieved by detecting and correcting misreport-
ing or by more public statements such as resigning from an en-
gagement. That can create a strategic temptation to be too 
strict on clients.  
Similar strategic misfires could arise under incentive pro-
grams. To police for such temptations in this context, contracts 
would specify not only the kinds of discoveries that generate 
 
 236. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 237. Daniel Goelzer, Board Member, PCAOB, Remarks at Columbia Uni-
versity Law School Conference, Gatekeepers Today: The Professions After the 
Reforms (Sept. 29, 2006). 
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compensation, but also provide for a verification procedure. For 
payments by issuers to gatekeepers, audit committees can per-
form this function; in the case of gatekeeper firm payments to 
internal personnel, verification committees could be estab-
lished. In general, however, it should be easier to detect fraud 
about fraud than fraud itself. 
3. Teams 
To expand the specific illustrations just given of how con-
tracts can be designed to create positive incentives, consider a 
broader framework involving the use of teams in the gatekeep-
ing setting. Traditionally, enterprises retain one law firm and 
engage one auditing firm in securities transactions and often, 
especially for law firms, they dispatch a single team of experts 
who work together on the matter. Commonly, another enter-
prise participating in the transaction likewise hires and dis-
patches lawyers and auditors (as with counterparties in a busi-
ness combination or financing arrangement). 
These traditional approaches could be adjusted. For exam-
ple, as Professor Coffee has explored heuristically, an enter-
prise could engage two separate teams of lawyers for a matter 
or retain a single law firm, but have it dispatch two separate 
teams.238 This construct reflects the dual role that lawyers play 
in such contexts, serving as advocates and advisors to the en-
terprise on the one hand and also serving a public gatekeeping 
function on the other. Tensions result. Using two firms or 
teams can enable the segregation of these functions so that 
each team can discharge professional responsibilities without 
ethical dissonance. While deploying two teams can be expensive 
and redundant, the notion should not be dismissed. 
First, auditors functionally deploy the equivalent of two 
teams to work on a single engagement. Audit firms dispatch 
engagement teams to work on particular audits, but these must 
report to and interact with partners and other teams in the 
firms’ national offices. The national office is functionally equiv-
alent to an incentives-driven supervisory team. Using incen-
tives, either team would be more willing to deploy more rigor-
ous auditing techniques, as where teams may elect to perform 
the more rigorous testing required in forensic audits than in 
traditional financial statement auditing. 
 
 238. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 318–30. 
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This auditing practice of using an engagement team sub-
ject to national office supervision has a parallel in the organiza-
tion of some large corporate law firms. They maintain internal 
policies that subject individual retentions to internal review. 
Examples include having a committee of partners review new 
clients and obtaining second- or third-partner review of firm 
opinions on certain matters before issuing them. The New York 
law firm of White & Case LLP famously implemented these 
structures in its agreement settling charges arising from its 
role in the notorious National Student Marketing fraud of the 
1970s.239 
Second, among lawyers, there invariably are two teams on 
cooperative transactions—usually from different law firms. In 
securities offerings, both the underwriter’s and the issuer’s 
counsel participate in due diligence exercises designed to ena-
ble the preparation of fair disclosure in the prospectus. In busi-
ness combinations, each side, buyer and seller, retains lawyers 
to negotiate the governing agreements, along with voluminous 
disclosure schedules, on the basis of respective due diligence 
investigations. Likewise, both sides’ lawyers often prepare opi-
nions in those transactions. While both sides seek to protect 
their own client’s position, they are most effective when gene-
rating maximum gains from the transaction-creating value, not 
just claiming it.240 
In transactions with two teams, it should be possible to de-
sign assignment and compensation contracts that, while meet-
ing professional responsibilities, also promote lawyers’ role as 
gatekeepers. The ideal would be contracts in which one team is 
designated as the closing team whose mission is to accomplish 
the transaction. The other is the gatekeeping team whose as-
signment is to perform due diligence and certification func-
tions. The closing team can be compensated conventionally, as 
based on billable hours, while the gatekeeping team can be 
compensated according to a base rate plus contingent bonuses 
for the discovery of misreporting (whether or not corrected). 
Addressing the specific professional responsibilities may be dif-
ficult, but the example suggests the vitality of Professor Cof-
fee’s heuristic. 
 
 239. See SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)  
¶ 95,912 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 1977). 
 240. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIA-
TOR 29–30 (1986), reprinted in DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 19–21 (2d ed. 2002). 
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Third, enlisting and designating two separate legal or au-
dit teams for a transaction copes with increased complicity 
risks when individuals and teams within a gatekeeper or 
among different gatekeepers are capable of conspiring. This is 
an important insight accompanying Professor McGowan’s pro-
posal to offer immunity to lawyers who disrupt misreporting: 
creating incentives to do so weakens the capacity to conspire.241 
Effective deal making requires that participants cooperate to a 
large extent; this capacity must be preserved. A good way to do 
so is to dispatch two teams with designated assignments, each 
of which would be cooperative to the end of (1) closing a trans-
action while (2) using fair reporting. Each would have incen-
tives that contribute to promoting that twin result. 
The dual-team approach reflects the insights from Warren 
Buffett’s and Professor Painter’s bilateral professional service 
retention models.242 Two teams facing different incentives will 
be inclined to exert pressure against each other. Misreporting 
temptations by the closing team are offset by opposite incen-
tives of the gatekeeping team; temptations to overzealousness 
among the gatekeeping team are constrained by the closing 
team’s contrary incentives.243 
C. PUBLIC RECOGNITION 
Apart from cash compensation channeled by contract to ef-
fective gatekeepers and team design, a broader range of public 
recognition could form part of a carrot system to supplement 
the traditional gatekeeping model. A proposal to provide public 
recognition raises and requires addressing several additional 
issues. These are cultural challenges to implementing the sys-
tem; the relation of compensation to professional morality; and 
how public recognition can create excessive incentives among 
gatekeepers to exercise gatekeeping prerogatives. 
1. Culture 
Effective gatekeeping relies not only on the conditions of 
reputation and liability threats but on broader cultural founda-
 
 241. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1825–26. 
 242. See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
 243. Other gatekeepers use separate teams from multiple firms or use mul-
tiple teams within a single firm, including co-lead managers in underwriting 
transactions, lead banks in bank lending syndicates, and risk and rating 
teams within rating agencies.  
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tions that make those stimuli function.244 In contemporary cul-
ture, media, regulators, and scholars concentrate on persons 
who failed to perform their functions. These persons or firms 
are “shamed” in the press, face liability at the hands of authori-
ties, and are given analytical attention by scholars inquiring 
into diagnostics that can yield normative policy implications.245 
Media, regulatory, or scholarly attention on those gatekeepers 
who perform their functions successfully is much rarer. For this 
reason alone, a merit system should have some appeal to high-
light the degree to which gatekeeping is effective. 
In contrast, such public recognition is showered on “heroes” 
who, after the fact, exercise authority to prosecute the villains. 
Consider Eliot Spitzer. As Attorney General of the State of New 
York, he earned public “hero” status for his enforcement of laws 
in a wide range of contexts in the postbubble fallout.246 That 
status, in turn, played a significant role in his subsequent elec-
tion as Governor of New York. True, private whistleblowers 
such as Sherron Watkins of Enron shared in some of the lime-
light, but even then received mixed reviews, in part for her  
emergence long after the scandal had incubated.247 Hero status 
is not conferred on gatekeepers or others who disrupt misre-
porting and correct it because their effectiveness is not normal-
ly publicly disclosed. 
 
 244. Cf. Frankel, supra note 1, at 162–65 (arguing that organization cul-
ture is the key to corporate honesty or rehabilitation); Jonathan R. Macey, A 
Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning 
the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 
329, 333–35 (2003) (noting that factors other than corporate governance and 
securities laws bear on the honesty of actors within those systems, including 
“religiously, culturally, and sociologically induced incentive structures”). 
 245. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Ex-
planation, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1518–20 (2004) (noting the prodigious vol-
ume of scholarship devoted to the Enron debacle and its implications for nor-
mative policy); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1811, 1814, 1841–50 (2001). 
 246. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations 
Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 120–22 (2004) (noting that Time 
Magazine named Spitzer the “crusader of the year”); Kulbir Walha & Edward 
E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfeasance or a Polit-
ically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh & 
McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1111–15 (2005). 
 247. E.g., Robert Salladay, ‘Snitch’ Bill Passed by State Senate, S.F. 
CHRON., June 21, 2002, at A1 (“Enron Vice President Sharon Watkins, hailed 
as a whistle-blower hero, had never informed the public or government about 
alleged wrongdoing but simply wrote a skeptical memo to the company chair-
man.”). 
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Consider a more proactive strategy of public recognition. 
Unlike with gatekeeping contracts or team structure compo-
nents of incentive programs, public recognition does not neces-
sarily require cash (or at least not large amounts).248 A good 
model of public recognition are the Malcolm Baldridge National 
Quality Awards, named for a United States Commerce Secre-
tary and awarded annually since 1988 to United States innova-
tors who demonstrate exemplary leadership in designated per-
formance categories.249 For capital market gatekeeping, the 
SEC or PCAOB could adapt this honor to recognize an “Auditor 
of the Year” or “Lawyer of the Year” for successful disruption of 
misreporting. It is more socially valuable to make heroes out of 
auditors and securities lawyers ex ante than of prosecutors (or 
plaintiffs’ lawyers) ex post. 
The parameters of systematic formal public recognition 
must be drawn carefully. This is necessary to appreciate a more 
general potential obstacle to paying rewards to effective gate-
keepers: a traditional cultural aversion to ratting in the United 
States.250 This aversion arises from how competing values such 
as loyalty and trust are implicated.251 These can be in tension 
with whistleblowing or gatekeeping, which are forms of ratting. 
The strength or frequency of the aversion is essentially imposs-
ible to estimate and can certainly be overstated. Yet the exis-
tence of governmental bounty programs (such as those of the 
IRS and SEC) and of qui tam actions suggest that inducements 
 
 248. Creative public funding devices may nevertheless be possible, with 
funds generated from such sources as the Fair Funds for Investors provisions 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, PCAOB’s budget generated from public company 
accounting support fees, royalties on sales of FASB products, fines imposed by 
PCAOB on audit firms, and profit disgorgement remedies the SEC obtains, 
whether under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or otherwise. One reason to prefer pri-
vate arrangements to such public devices is the risk that the government 
agencies will not actually pay. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 38, at 1155 
(noting congressional testimony of Duke Law Professor James Cox stating 
that “that the biggest problem with a proposed insider trading bounty pro-
gram would be the SEC’s likely unwillingness to actually give out any re-
wards”). 
 249. See Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Improvement Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-107, 101 Stat. 724; Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Bal-
dridge National Quality Program, http://www.quality.nist.gov/PDF_files/ 
Improvement_Act.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 250. See generally ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002) (exploring the cultural 
anxieties of ratting and betrayal). 
 251. Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and 
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) 
(inquiring into the roles of trust and loyalty in corporate relationships). 
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are necessary to entice United States persons to rat on fellow 
citizens.252 
On the other hand, for capital market gatekeepers, these 
tensions should be more attenuated than for other citizens. The 
professional status of most gatekeepers embraces probity and 
integrity more compatible with disrupting misreporting than 
with loyalty in acquiescing to it. This tendency is probably 
strongest for auditors, whose training and self-identification 
entails professional skepticism that is a cognate of ratting.253 
The common designation of the profession as a public watchdog 
bears this out. 
In contrast, lawyers face conflicting values. Enlisting law-
yers as capital market watchdogs confronts the profession’s 
traditional advocacy model and resulting principles of confiden-
tiality epitomized in the attorney-client privilege.254 Lawyers 
have not historically assumed a watchdog identity comparable 
to that of auditors. Despite that history, some sense of a watch-
dog function has animated at least part of the professional 
identity of the securities lawyer—as it has for other private 
lawyers who play a quasi-public role.255 For securities lawyers 
willing to accept this somewhat complex identity, a carrot sys-
tem can ease resulting tensions. 
Either way, however, public recognition for such activities 
must be carefully drawn to be in tune with the public’s general 
aversion to ratting. The “heroes” must be portrayed in much 
the way that Elliott Spitzer was presented. They must be seen 
as dedicated, public-minded professionals, perhaps seeking to 
advance their own careers—as Spitzer certainly did—but only 
in a way that is consistent with the public interest—likewise, 
as Spitzer did.256 
 
 252. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 253. See CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, State-
ment on Auditing Standards No. 57, § 324.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants 2004); CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82, (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accoun-
tants 1997) (“Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise profession-
al skepticism. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a question-
ing mind and critical assessment of audit evidence.”). 
 254. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (2000) (observing the close and often conflicting 
connection between confidentiality and zealous advocacy).  
 255. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3–17 (1993) (meditating upon moral character and the 
ideal of the lawyer as “statesman”). 
 256. See Walha & Filusch, supra note 246, at 1131 (“Spitzer has been de-
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2. Functions 
The prevailing lack of public recognition for successful  
gatekeeping may also be due to the historical emphasis on ga-
tekeeping functions as opposed to whistleblower functions. 
That is, gatekeeper models are designed to act internally with-
in an enterprise rather than to shine the public spotlight on it. 
But public recognition for successful gatekeeping obviously 
would alter that. 
A good example occurred in the 1970s when the auditing 
firm of Arthur Young blew the whistle on, and withheld sup-
port from, Lockheed Corporation amid the foreign government 
bribery scandals of that era.257 Lockheed and its top managers 
had much to gain from concealing the scheme—it was criminal. 
But Arthur Young disrupted their ability to do so by disrupting 
Lockheed’s access to capital markets. As theory would predict 
and explain, in Professor Kraakman’s terms, Arthur Young had 
little to gain and much to lose from complicity.258 And Arthur 
Young received considerable public recognition for its refusal in 
the contemporary press.259 
In contrast, today’s sensibilities shower less praise on ef-
fective gatekeepers and instead tend to diagnose pathological 
cases for lessons about what went wrong and then generalize 
from these for systemic reform.260 With that orientation, it is 
unsurprising that policymakers and scholars incline toward re-
 
scribed as an ambitious political figure . . . [and yet] many Americans view 
Spitzer as someone who personifies integrity and trust, view these complaints 
as Wall Street trying to protect itself, and most importantly, view Spitzer as 
someone who has fought against corporate greed on their behalf.”). 
 257. See John Braithwaite, On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: 
Neglected Dimensions of a Republican Separation of Powers, 47 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 305, 334–35 (1997) (discussing how Arthur Young, auditors of Lockheed, 
“put their responsible corporate self forward by refusing to certify the Lock-
heed Annual Report,” prompting managers to respond, deliberate, and reform, 
and amid the resulting “domino-effect of public-regarding deliberation,” Lock-
heed became “a born again corporation” (attributing this latter phrase to DA-
VID BOULTON, THE GREASE MACHINE 276 (1978), and noting that additional 
details appear in BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC-
ITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 144 (1983))). 
 258. See supra text accompanying note 181. 
 259. E.g. William A. Shumann, Lockheed Agrees to End Payouts Abroad, 
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 1, 1975, at 19, 21; Robert M. Smith, Ja-
pan Rightist Got $7 Million from Lockheed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1; Ro-
bert M. Smith, Lockheed Sought to Give Costly Boat as Impetus to Sale, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1975, at 1. 
 260. See Mitchell, supra note 245, at 1518–25 (observing the “dizzying ar-
ray” of scholarship mining the Enron collapse for policy implications). 
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fashioning the duties and liability strategies in search of op-
timal deterrence. An alternative, less common approach would 
examine how and why things go well. Reputation and liability 
risks may influence a professional’s decision making, but more 
fundamental norms drive professional behavior too.261 Many 
professionals who perform effectively do so to obtain satisfac-
tion from a job well done—not for fear of liability or damaging 
reputation. What should the consequences be of doing a good 
job? 
For many critics, it appears that doing a required job is 
simply the norm and doing it well deserves no special praise. 
But if one condemns those who fail in their job, why not be will-
ing to recognize those who perform their jobs well? A more gen-
eral and affirming response to good work is recognition. This 
can assume many forms, from a simple expression of gratitude 
(like a supervisor’s pat on the back or handwritten note)262 to a 
more forthright public expression of appreciation. A carrot sys-
tem could envision that kind of public recognition for disrupt-
ing misreporting (in addition to the form of cash incentive pro-
grams discussed in the preceding Section). 
This may raise an objection. It may appear redundant to 
pay gatekeepers extra for doing what they ought to do—
whether required by law or by professional or other nonlegal 
commands.263 As to legal requirements, the proposal preempts 
this objection to avoid problems of contract law’s preexisting 
duty rule.264 The proposal envisions a program that pays com-
pensation or recognition for performing functions that are not 
otherwise legally required. As to professional or other nonlegal 
commands, the objection is harder to meet, for it is valiant to 
emphasize such commands and project ethical appeals to in-
duce superior gatekeeping. Yet it seems more realistic to ap-
 
 261. Cf. JEFFREY PFEFFER, THE HUMAN EQUATION: BUILDING PROFITS BY 
PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 131–35 (1998) (indicating how norms and attitudes 
fundamentally shape company conduct, even to the financial and productive 
detriment of organizations). 
 262. See Paul Strebel, Why Do Employees Resist Change?, HARV. BUS. REV., 
May-June 1996, at 86, 88 (observing that employee loyalty and commitment 
are connected to managerial recognition of a job well done). 
 263. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 172 (“A direct monetary reward for ho-
nesty is unseemly. Honesty should be considered the rule and not the excep-
tion . . . . A monetary reward undermines the values of self-limitation and self-
control in the face of temptation.”). 
 264. Cf. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213 (Kan. 1919) (holding that a police officer 
is ineligible for a contractual reward for apprehending an alleged criminal giv-
en his pre-existing duty to do so). 
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preciate how cash and public recognition can contribute to 
achieving those aspirations. 
Perhaps paradoxically, cash and recognition may even be 
edifying vehicles to reinforce professional principles. Consider 
how structural forces catalogued earlier may have reduced ga-
tekeeper incentives to invest in reputational capital.265 Among 
audit firms, the phenomenon of cross-selling (bundling consult-
ing assignments to auditing engagements) changed auditing 
culture from professionalism to commercialism. Since reversing 
culture is difficult,266 tools that work within existing culture 
are more promising than those alien to it. A carrot system 
works within existing commercial culture by paying people bo-
nuses when successful as detectives. That should induce in-
vestment in reputation despite contrary forces and that, in 
turn, would promote an ethical sense of probity and integrity 
among those so compensated. 
3. Effects 
In the years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, critics 
complained of what they saw as a decline in United States’ 
competitiveness in global capital markets. They cited a de-
crease in the frequency and size of initial public offerings in 
New York compared to London, and a decline in the number of 
public companies listed in the United States.267 Implicitly, 
these critics essentially argue that gatekeeping can be too effec-
tive. A carrot system, in this view, is the last thing these mar-
kets need. This critique invites brief remarks on the parallel 
but different system of gatekeeping that appears in the legisla-
tive process. 
Certain theories of the legislative process emphasize the 
presence of multiple “vetogates.”268 These refer to choke points 
 
 265. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 329–30; see supra text ac-
companying notes 104–61. 
 266. See Robert A. Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the 
Impact of Section 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 
49–53, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991295) (discussing difficulties 
and prospects of how legal changes concerning the testing of internal controls 
may influence corporate culture). 
 267. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 2–3, 
26–29, 39–44 (2006); MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 9 (2007) (referencing data concen-
trating on the relative number of initial public offerings made in New York 
and London in the periods before and after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act). 
 268. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
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in the legislative process that enable participants to obstruct 
the passage of legislation.269 Examples include congressional 
bicameralism, presidential presentment, supermajority voting 
(as with overriding a presidential veto), formal standing rules, 
senatorial rules concerning filibusters and cloture, the commit-
tee and conference reporting systems, and even informal legis-
lative mores.270 Numerous gatekeepers participate in activating 
these vetogates, including the President, as well as committee 
chairs, senior Senators and House members and, especially, 
lobbyists.271 The result is that the vast majority of bills do not 
become law, a deliberate strategy designed to minimize the risk 
of suboptimal lawmaking as well as to promote confidence that 
law is supported by consensus.272 
Compared to the legislative process, the capital formation 
process is modestly parallel yet radically different. The parallel 
concerns how system design contains numerous vetogates. 
Consider the many opportunities to activate vetogates in a typ-
ical securities transaction, say a public offering: hiring an un-
derwriter to sell it; attracting securities analysts to follow it; 
retaining lawyers to negotiate and document the terms and 
furnish legal opinions; engaging auditors to audit financial 
statements (and internal controls) and offer related comfort let-
ters; for debt, getting a rating agency to rate it; requesting that 
the SEC declare the related registration statement effective; 
and closing the transaction. Without being scientific about it, 
there appear to be as many vetogates in capital market trans-
actions as there are in the legislative process. 
The radical differences between vetogates in legislative 
processes compared to capital market transactions concern the 
purpose of these devices and the orientation of participants. Ve-
togates in legislative processes are intended to reduce the prob-
 
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66–67 (3d ed. 2001). 
 269. Id. at 66. 
 270. See id. at 24, 66. 
 271. Id. at 74–76; COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 10 n.1 (“Politi-
cal scientists regard congressional committees as the gatekeepers of the legis-
lative process.”); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED 
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317, 395–96 (1986) (observing that in-
terest groups are more successful at preventing than facilitating legislation 
because “there are so many opportunities for throwing up roadblocks to un-
wanted action”). 
 272. The concept of vetogates has been adapted to other collective decision-
making processes, such as generating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1129 (2002). 
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ability of passing legislation and this is seen as necessary to 
promote the appearance and achievement of consensus and the 
effectiveness of laws.273 For securities transactions, the cultural 
milieu is nearly exactly the opposite. Participants want to faci-
litate the deal, enable the financing, and form or transfer capital. 
Some vocal critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imply that 
more capital market transactions are better and more public 
companies are better—they criticize the Act’s fallout by show-
ing proportionately fewer public offerings made in New York 
compared to London and a falling number of public companies 
in the United States.274 But becoming and staying a public 
company historically were—and probably should be—badges of 
honor. To sustain that designation, it should not necessarily be 
easier to become or continue as a public company than it is for 
a bill to become law. 
It is unlikely that vetogating in capital markets would or 
should ever be more common than vetogating in legislative 
processes. Capital market vetogates are not discretionary in 
the same way they can be in the legislative process. Rather, the 
system installs additional cross-checks designed to counterbal-
ance competing incentives. Managers who are inclined to mis-
report when doing so earns lucrative gains from stock options 
currently face gatekeepers whose compensation is not tied to 
reporting accuracy, except through vague reputation con-
straints and liability risks. Tying gatekeeper compensation to 
the disruption of misreporting would neutralize contrary incen-
tives. The potential risk the system raises of excessive vetogat-
ing is further reduced by the continuing presence of partici-
pants with strong incentives to get deals or audits done. 
  CONCLUSION   
Regulatory reform and scholarly literature concerning cap-
ital market gatekeepers have historically concentrated on pe-
 
 273. See ESKIRIDGE ET AL., supra note 268, at 65–71. 
 274. See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY 
DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED, HOW TO FIX IT 71–73 (2006); William J. 
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going 
Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141–43 (2006); see also Ehud Kamar et al., 
Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country 
Analysis 1–2 (U.S.C. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C06-5, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769; Christian Leuz et al., Why 
Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC De-
registration 1–4, 22–23 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper 
No. 155/2007, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=592421. 
CUNNINGHAM_6FMT 1/22/2008 12:13 PM 
386 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:323 
 
nalties for failing to meet legal duties or structures to promote 
investment in reputations. Imposing penalties to deter acquies-
cence is a natural response, in part because acquiescent gate-
keepers assume a vivid public posture amid publicized fraud, 
and in part because lawyers and law naturally look to liability 
design to influence behavior. Penalties may be necessary to 
achieve optimal deterrence. Promoting investment in reputa-
tions for integrity likewise produces a valuable contribution to 
capital market integrity. 
A new line of inquiry is developing that focuses on reward-
ing gatekeepers. This innovation should have considerable pur-
chase when one considers how the reputational constraint and 
liability threats were insufficient to deter widespread ineffec-
tive gatekeeping during the late 1990s and early 2000s. We 
have learned in recent decades that positive incentives may be 
more likely than negative threats to promote desired behavior. 
That insight can and should be adapted to promote effective 
capital market gatekeeping. The examples provided in this Ar-
ticle of how to redesign contractual cash flows and deploy pro-
fessional teams, as well as increase public recognition for gate-
keeping success, are intended to advance that discussion. 
